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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs.BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants,

Case No. 8457

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Intervenor and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The declaratory judgment in the lower court was
based upon documents received in evidence over the objection of appellants. It was not based upon an academic
issue. Appellants' "Statement of Facts" is a statement
of propositions of law. The facts are set forth in Exhibit
2. Restated they are in part as follows:
1. The appropriated funds for the operation of
Weber College allocated to the eighth quarter of the
~
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biennium were reduced by the governor on the day i1
was expendable in the month of April, 1953, by $5,000.00.
(Exhibit 2, Page 5)
2. The appropriated funds to Weber College for the
first fiscal year of the 1953-1955 biennium were reduced
by the governor by $79,027.91.
3. The appropriated funds to Carbon Junior College were likewise reduced by the governor on Aprill,
1953, the· day they were expendable, by $2,000.00. (Exhibit
2, Page 10)
4. The appropriated funds to Dixie Junior College
were also reduced by the governor on April1, 1953, the
day they were expendable, by $4,000.00 for one month.
(Exhibit 2, Page 14)
5. The governor and State Finance Commission
refused to make available to the Board of Education,
for research, appropriated funds in the amount of $20,000.00. (Exhibit 2, Page 24)
6. The Finance Commission in 1948 refused to pay
salaries fixed by the Board of Education for administrative and supervisory personnel. (Exhibit 2, Page 43)
7. The Finance Commission again refused in 1949
to pay increased salaries for staff members approved by
the Board of Education. (Exhibit 2, Page 47)
8. The Finance Commission again refused in 1950
to pay salaries fixed by the Board of Education to staff
members. (Exhibit 2, Page 56)
6
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9. The Board of Examiners refused in 1951 to pay
the salary of the Superintendent of the School for the
Deaf and the Blind fixed by the Board of Education at
$500.00 per month and cut the salary to $425.00 per
month. (Exhibit 2, Page 65)
10. The Board of Examiners denied in 1952 the
request of the Board of Education for authority to employ a custodian of a building on an overtime b.asis.
(Exhibit 2, Page 85)
11. The Board of Examiners in 1953 directed th~
l!..,inance Commission to reduce the salary of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, as fixed by the
Board of Education from $10,000.00 per .annum to $6,000.00 per annum. (Exhibit 2, Page 91)
12. The Board of Examiners then instructed the
Finance Commission to delete the name of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction from the payroll.
(Exhibit 2, Page 94)
13. The State Board of Examiners in 1953 denied
.a request of the Board of Education for approval of a
salary of $5,200.00 a year to be paid a director of elementary education. (Exhibit 2, Page 98)
14. A demand made in 1952 for payment of legal
services incurred and costs for printing of leg.al briefs
for the Board of Education was denied by the Finance
Commission and treated by the Commission and the
Board of Examiners as a claim against the St~ate requiring an act of the Legislature to authorize payment. (Exhibit 2, Page 104)
7
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15. Request dated March 20, 1953, by the Board oJ
Education of the Attorney General for special leg&
counsel selected by the Board to represent it in its claim
against the Board of Examiners, of which the Attorney
General is a member, asserting that the salary of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction may be fixed by
the Board of Education was denied. (Exhibit 2, Page
107)
The foregoing Statement of Facts is indicative of the
course of conduct found by the lower court to be illegal
and beyond the powers of the Appellants. This is a
justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination.
(See State of Wisconsin ex rei. Philip F. LaFollette,
Governor, v. Theodore Dammann, Secretary of State,
2641\!W 627,103 ALR 1089)
The appellants have chosen to argue the points involved in this case in seven parts. Respondents believe
the subject matter more logically lends itself to a division
into five parts as set forth in the five points hereinafter
stated.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DISAPPROVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS
BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOL PURPOSES.

8
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POINT II
THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REDUCE APPROPRIATIONS MADE BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR
PUBLIC SCHOOL PURPOSES.
POINT III
IF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR FINANCE COMMISSION HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE APPROPRIATED FUNDS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, IT IS
MINISTERIAL.
POINT IV
JN, THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
POINT V
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION MAY EMPLOY INDEPENDENT LEGAL 'COUNSEL WHEN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL IS REPRESENTING OTHER STATE AGENCIES
ASSERTING RIGHTS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DISAPPROVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS
BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOL PURPOSES.

9
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A. The construction of similar constitutional an(
statutory authority prior to statehood in Utah limite(
the powers of the Board of Education.
In the decision involving the Plaintiff and Defend.
ant in these proceedings, this court carefully traced the
history of the constitutional provisions of the statntt!G
surrounding the establishments of institutions of higher
learning in the respective states of the country. The
historical background in the western states of the constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case
are likewise important and will first be considered.
It is unfortunate that the Appellant in a statement
of facts should express an opinion misconstruing the
scholarly decision of the District Court. In a C'areful
analysis and comparison of the State Constitution and
the Federal Constitution, the District Court made clear
the distinction between the State Executive Branch of
Government under the State Constitution, which vested
powers in the Board of Education and not the Chief Executive, and the Federal Executive Branch of Government
which vests full executive power in the President. (Page
4, District Court Men1orandum Decision)
The issues herein involve the interpretation of two
constitutional provisions: The first is Article 10, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution which reads:
"The general control and supervision of the
Public School System shall be vested in the State
Board of Education, consisting of the Superintendent of P~blic Instruction and such other persons
as the legislature may provide."
10
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Respondent will undertake to enlarge upon the clear and
concise treatment and analysis of this constitutional provision made by the District Court in the first six pages
of its decision. This constitutional provision has bearing upon the five points treated in this brief and will be
discuss as it applies to each point.
The other constitutional provision is Article 7, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, which reads:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General
shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, which Board shall have such supervision of all matters connected with the State Prison as may be provided by law. They shall, also,
constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to
examine all claims against the state, except
salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law,
and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the state,
except for salaries and compensation of officers
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the legislature without having been considered and acted
upon by the State Board of Examiners."
We here cite the last four pages of the District Court's
decision, concur in its reasoning, and propose hereinafter
to enlarge upon the legal citation of authority and conclusions therein expressed.
A recognized rule of construction in determining
the intent of the framers of constitutional provisions of
legislative acts is to look to other states which have
11
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similar provisions and which have been construed
the time of adoption of the provision in question.

l

Prior to the constitutional convention of the sta1
of Utah the states of Nevada and Idaho had provide
in their constitutions for a Board of Examiners. Ca:
ifornia had similar provisions in statutory law. Case
from these three states, prior to the Utah ConstitutioJ
limited the authority of the Board of Examiners.
1.

The Nevada Cases

The Nevada constitutional provision creating ~
Board of Examiners is identical with the Utah provisio]j
except "until otherwise provided by law'' is omitted
(Article 4, Section 21) The Nevada cases held that a
"claim against the State" did not include payments
originating with state agencies or liquidated claims. The
Board of Examiners was also said to have only advisory
authority as to claims requiring its examination.
In Ash v. Parkinson 5 Nev. 15 (1869) an action was
brought by the Sergeant at Arms of the Assembly of the
State of Nevada for a writ of mandamus compelling the
Comptroller of the state to pay a sUm. due the Sergeant
at Arms for services rendered and a $5,000 contjngent
fund for use by the Assembly. The claim had not been
submitted to the Board of Examiners and the Comp·
troller refused to issue a warrant. In considering this
question the court said:
"A claim is a demand by someone other than
the state against it for money or property; but
when the claim originates with the state, or in its
12
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behalf, and contemporaneously with its origin, and
means and manner of payment are provided, as
in the case of a bond, it does not then constitute
a claim proper against the st.ate, but a liquidated
and legalized demand against the treasurer.***"
A second Nevada c.ase decided a year later concerning the authority of the Board of Examiners was
Lewis vs. Doran 5 Nev. 399 (1870). Plaintiff brought
a suit for a printing bill against the Comptroller alleging that he had performed his services as agreed and
that his bill had been approved by the Board of Examiners and the Comptroller was refusing a w.arrant for payment. Plaintiff contended that upon examination by the
Board of Examiners no further action was necessary and
the claim should have been allowed. The court stated
that the provisions of the constitution that no claims
shall be passed upon by the Legislature without having
been considered and acted upon by Board of Examiners
was merely a statement that examination by the Bo.ard
of Examiners was only advisory to the Legislature. This
would give effect to the two provisions of the Constitution.
The court held that the board was only advisory to
the Comptroller and that the Comptroller had authority
over the .allowance of claims irrespective of the action
of the Board of Examiners. The examination by the
Board of Examiners was intended as a double check on
the disbursement of funds to accomplish its purpose by
"giving a fuller airing and ventilation of claims,
that might or probably would follow from one
examination."

13
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A third Nevada case decided prior to the adoptio1
was State v. llallock, 22 Pac. 123, 20 Nev. 326 (1889). Th~
court stated the issue in this case as follows:
"The question is whether the Legislature caz
require the Comptroller to draw his warrant f01
the amount ascertained to be due by the Board
of County Commissioners, or whether the StatE
Board of Examiners, under the provisions of the
Constitution, should have audited the claim."
The court then cites the constitutional provisio11
creating the Board of Examiners and the statutes there.
under which provide that, for a claim for which an ap.
propriation has been made but the amount of the claim
has not been liquidated, such claim must be presente<l
to the Board of Examiners. Another statute provide~
that for claims for which no appropriation has been made
it must be approved by the Board of Examiners before
submitted to the legislature. After examining these provisions of the statutes and reasoning that they are logica1
in their application, the court states as follows:
"These provisions of the statutes present a
practical and reasonable exposition of the provisions of the Constitution, and place the authority to audit unliquidated claims with the board
created for that purpose by the Constitution."
2.

The California cases

The California decisions prior to the adoption of
our Constitution held that disbursements authorized b~
the state agencies need not be examined by the Boar<l
of Examiners.
14
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The Constitution of the State of California did not
establish a Board of Examiners. The Legislature, in
enacting its Political Code in 1872, provided by Section
364 that the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney
General would constitute the Board of Examiners. The
power and duty of the Board of Examiners was set out
in Article 18 of the Political Code and the provisions
there, with reference to the presentation of claims for
which appropriations have been made or the presentation of claims for which no appropriation has been made,
are practically identical with the early statutory provisions and the present law in Utah.
California, like Nevada, held that claims originating
with state .agencies were not to be reviewed by the Board
of Examiners. In the early case of The Board of Trustees of the State Library vs. Kenfield, 55 Gal. 488 (1880),
an action was brought to determine whether a voucher
drawn by the Board of Trustees of the Library must
first present their claim to the Board of Examiners for
its .approval before money could be drawn by the Treasurer. The court's entire decision on this matter is as
follows:
"This is an application for a writ of mandate,
requiring the respondent, State Comptroller, to
draw his warrant upon the State Treasurer, in
favor of petitioner, for money in the State Treasury belonging to the State Library fund. The
objection is urged by respondent that the books,
etc., required by the library should first be purchased, and the claims therefore be presented to
the Board of Examiners for their inspection and
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approval. We do not think that the transactions
of the Board of Trustees are the basis of claims
within the meaning of Section 616 Political Code.
The chapter of the Political Code referring to the
State Library, places the library under the control of the Board of Trustees, and authorized the
board to draw from the State Treasury, at any
time, all the moneys therein belonging to the
library fund; and the librarian is to purchase
books, maps, engravings, paintings, and furniture
for the library, 'according to such rules and regulations which the Board of Trustees may prescribe.' Their judgment then, as to what books,
etc., may be proper, to be added to the library is
not subject to review by the Board of Examiners."
The holding of this decision in 1880, so far as respondents can discover, has not been challenged by any subsequent case.
3.

The Idaho cases.

The only Idaho case prior to the adoption of our
Constitution followed the Nevada case of State v. Hallock supra and limited the provision to unliquidated
claims. Section 18, Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution
creating the Board of Examiners used identically the
same language as contained in the Utah Constitution with
the exception that the section is not prefaced with the
statement "until otherwise provided by law."
In TVinters v. Ramsey, 39 Pac. 193, decided in
January, 1895 an action was brought to require the State
Auditor to issue a warrant for the payment of an amount.
claimed by the plaintiff owing on a contract for the con16
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struction of a wagon road. The court reviewed the constitutional and statutory authority of the Board of Examiners and then stated as follows:
"These sections of the Constitution and the
statute require all claims against the State of
an unliquidated character shall be submitted to
this board for approval or rejection before the
auditor shall draw his warrant therefor. This
claim is of the class that must be submitted to
this board, and approved by it, before the auditor
can draw a warrant in payment thereof. The disposition of the court is upheld in the case of State
vs. Hallock (Nev.) 22 Pac. 123, in which this precise clause in the Constitution of Nevada is passed
upon by the court, and wherein the same position is taken by the court. These conditions precedent not having been complied with, the motion
to grant the alternative writ is allowed, and the
petition dismissed."
From the decisions in California, Nevada and Idaho
prior tq the adoption in Utah of our Constitution we may
conclude:
1. That a claim as referred to in the Constitution
is not a demand by the state or a claim which originates
with the state in its behalf and arises contemporaneously
with the origin of the demand. (Ash vs. Parkinson
supra)
2. The examination by the Board of Examiners is
only advisory, and an additional check upon the payment
of funds, the auditor having the ultimate power and
authority to approve claims rather than the Board of
Examiners. (Lewis v. Do ron supra)
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3. Only unliquidated claims were intended to be
presented to the Board of Examiners, for review and
determination of the amount involved. (State v. Hallock
supra)
4. "Claims" did not include payment and disbursement of money .authorized by other political agencies
whose purchases and disbursements were not subject to
review by the Board of Examiners. (The Board of
Trustees of the State Library v. Kenfield, supra.)
B. The Constitutional Convention debates clearly
indicate that Section 13 could be subsequently modified
by the Legislature.
At the time of the constitutional convention there
was considerable discussion concerning the adoption of
Section 12, Board of Pardons, Section 13, State Prison
Commissioners and Board of Examiners, Section 14,
Insane Asylum Commissioners, and Section 15, Reform
School Commissioners in Article ·vii of the Utah Constitution. It will be noted that Section 12 is the forerunner of the four sections mentioned above, all of which
deal with the establishment of some type of board or
commission for the administration of specific agencies.
At the constitutional convention it was moved that
all of these sections be stricken for the reason that
they were legislative in nature. The argnn1ent advanced
when Section 12 was considered and action taken in connection therewith was applied in a routine fashion to the
18
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other three sections. At the time of the second reading of
these sections it was stated :
"You will find in the report that after the
third line in that section that which follows is
legislation, pure and simple, and of such a nature
that the Legislature should have control of it, .and
they should have the power to change it when the
necessities of our government may demand it.
"" * "" It will relieve us of a great amount of
legislation, a tendency which is added in most constitutions of states recently formed, because we
have tended in that direction too much. I prefer
th.at we leave some little to the Legislature." Vol.
1, Proceedings Constitutional Convention 933.
The proceedings of the constitutional convention
indicate that the framers of the Utah Constitution considered the section creating the Board of Examiners as
involving a legislative function and, therefore, provided
that the agency cre.ated by the Constitution should be
maintained only until the functions were otherwise assigned by the Legislature.
When the matters were debated later the following
statements were made :
"Mr. Thurman. 'Mr. Chairman, I would like
to offer a substitute for both of these.' (Reads)
'Until otherwise provided by law the Governor sh.all have power to remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons
for all offenses against the State.'
I do not se·e why this matter cannot be left to
the Legislature. Of course, this leaves the matter
where it is now ,but it gives to the Legislature the
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right to create a board such as is here named, or
any other kind of a board of pardons. • • •
"l\ir. Varian. 'Mr. Chairman, taking the propositions in their order, I would suggest, in speaking to the substitute offered by my friend from
Utah County, that there is no reason why we
should not leave it to the Legislature.' • • • "
When these sections came up for final reading the
proceedings were as follows :
"l\ir. Hyde. 'Mr. President, I have an amendment to offer to Section 12, insert at the beginning of the section, 'until otherwise provided by
law.'
The amendment was agreed to • • • .
Mr. Emery. 'Mr. President, I have no objection particularly to this section, but I think it
deals with legislative matters too much.' • • •
Section 13 was read.
Mr. Hyde. 'Mr. President, I offer an amendment on that section, to add at the beginning of
the section 'until otherwise provided by law'. '
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. Creer. 'Mr. President, I move an amendment to precede this section, similar to the one
made to the other, 'until otherwise provided by
law' And I may also offer the same amendment
to Section.'
The amendment "~as agreed to."
(Vol. II Proceedings Constitutional Convention

1895)
The Defendants argue that this amendment related
only to the composition of the Board, and not to its pow·
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ers. This argumer:tt ·may find some support in thP
technical wording of this section, but such an argument
is not inconsistent with the constitutional debates.
At the time of our constitutional convention it must
be remembered that the states of Idaho and Nevada had
incorporated into their constitutions provisions creating
Boards of Examiners. On the other hand, the State
of California had by statute created a Board of Examiners. In view of these two different ways of handling the matter in other states, it was to be expected that
in our constitutional convention there would be some dispute as to whether such provisions should be in the constitution or should be handled by the legislature. It will
be remembered that Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the
Executive Article of the Constitution established administrative boards and agencies. It was first moved that
Section 12 be stricken from the proposed Article. This
motion was rejected. Thereafter there was some discussion with reference to Sections 13, 14 and 15. One of
the delegates stated as follows :
"Mr. Chairman, I hope the motion will prevail to strike out Sections 13, 14 and 15. They are
legislation pure and simple. If they work well, all
right. If they do not work right we cannot get
rid of them until the constitution is amended or
until we have a new constitution." Vol II Proceedings Constitutional Convention, 1015-16.
Delegate Varian, Chairman of the Committee on the
executive branch of the government, argued at the time
of the second reading of the section that
21
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"The Convention should not refuse to put
it into the Constitution because, as claimed, it is
a matter of legislation. Of course, it is legislation-fundamental legislation. If they desire to
leave the matter open for change, it is easy enough
to amend all these sections by saying, 'until otherwise provided by law.' That would obviate that
objection, if it is an objection to the members of
the Convention. It is not a reason for striking out
the entire section." II Proceedings Constitutional
Convention, 1017. (Empha;sis added)
It will be recalled that upon final reading all of these
sections were so amended by .adding at the beginning of
each section the words "until otherwise provided by law.''
In spite of the convention debate Defendants argue
that the words "until otherwise provided by law~' only
affect the composition of the Board of Examiners· and
do not and cannot affect the constitutional power and
.authority of the Board. This contention is based on the
fact that part of the section stated "with power to examine all claims against the state • • • and perform such
other duties as may be prescribed by law." It is the
Defendants' contention that it would be unnecessary to
add the words "as may be prescribed by law" if it was in
tended that the words "until otherwise provided by law"
permitted the legislature to amend the entire section as
it might deem appropriate.
If the section had been originally drafted as it was
finally enacted, there would be merit to such an argument. Without the amendment the section defined some
of the duties of the Board of Examiners and authorized
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the legislature to prescribe additional duties. Later, when
the amendment "until otherwise provided by law" was
eD!acted, the provrsion authorizing the legislature to provide additional duties became in p.art redundant but
through indavertence was not deleted.
The .attention of the convention was directed to the
issue of whether the section should be frozen in the
constitution, or whether, if included in the constitution,
some provision should not be made permitting unlimited
change in the future by the legislature. The fact that
the constitutional section defines some of the duties of
the Board of Examiners and specifies that they shall
perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law,
cannot, in view of the history of the enactment of this
section, be interpreted to restrict the meaning of the
words "until otherwise provided by l.aw." A reading of
the proceedings at the constitutional convention can
leave no doubt that the framers of the constitution intended that all of these sections creating administrative
agencies could be completely modified by future legislative enactment.
Other constitutional provisions prefaced by "until
otherwise provided by law" in Sections 12, 13, 14 .and 15
of the same Article VII have all been modified by the
Legislature and superseded by statutory enactments.
Section 12 creating the Board of Pardons has been
altered as shown by the present section 77-62-2 and 7762-3 U.C.A. 1953. Part of Section 13 pertaining to the
St.ate Prison Commissioners has been modified as shown
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in Section 64-9-1, U.C.A. 1955. Section 14 has been modified as shown in Section 64-7-2, U.C.A. 1953, and also
Section 15 has been modified as contained in Section
64-6-1 and 64-6-2, U.C.A.1953.
It is respectfully submitted that the Legislature has
intended to modify the remainder of Section 13 to permit the Department of Finance to review miscellaneous
personal claims. In addition to being a board of review
ing claims, the Board of Examiners was given the duty
of being a board of supplies and purchases. (Stipulation
Count 2, Paragraph 13) Thereafter when the Department
of Finance was created, the functions of the Board of
Examiners were transferred to the Commission of Finance which was to pre-audit all claims and the auditor
was to post-audit the claims. Had the Legislature intended to require in addition to the approval of the Commission of Finance the approval of the Board of Examiners, they would have so provided since by specific
amendment they were taking from the Board of Examiners this authority and transferring it to a new department.
4

In light of the history of the incorporation into the
Constitution, "until otherwise provided by law," the
Legislature has now provided by statute elaborate
methods for handling claims against the state. The
Board of Education must comply with proper accounting procedures to safeguard and protect public funds.
But such accounting procedures cannot nullify the authority of the Board of Education as specified in the
Constitution.
24
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The Defendants argue that after the above discussed
provision w.as inserted by amendment into these sections, a substitute to Section 12 was offered and rejected.
A reading of the manner in which the substitute was offered clearly shows that the delegate wanted to substitute a short, concise paragraph for Section 12 in lieu
of the rather lengthly and detailed section that was
adopted. This being the purpose for the substitute, it
cannot be validly argued that the reason the substitute
was submitted was because it was felt that the provision
"until otherwise provided by law" did not permit future
modification by the legislature. The Defendants cite the
case of Bishop vs. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah
478, 52 Pac. 1090, which held that an ~a0t empowering the
Board of Corrections, rather than the Board of Pardons,
to parole convicts under certain restrictions and limita.
tions was unconstitutional. That case merely holds that
until authority of the Board of Pardons as created by
the constitution is changed by a legislative enactment
another tribunal cannot exercise authority granted to
the Board of Pardons. The issue herein discussed was
not presented to the court. It was a case where the
legislature had not modified the laws relating to the
Board of Pardons but had attempted to create co-existent
authority in the Board of Corrections involving some
authority already granted to the Board of Pardons.
For further enlightenment as to the intention of the
framers of the constitution, an examination of the implementing legislation passed in 1896 immediately after
the adoption of the constitution shows that it was not the
25
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intent of the legislature as they interpreted the constitution that the Board of Examiners should control all disbursement of funds. Sec. 18, Chapter 35, Laws of Utah,
1896, defining the duties of the Board of Examiners provided:
"The state auditor shall not draw his warrant for any claim, unless it has been approved
by the Board, except for salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, or for monies expressly appropriated by statute."
This additional provision was not found in the Montana
Political Code Section 680, Codes and Statutes of Montana, 1895, which was otherwise copied by the Utah legislature verbatim.
The first Utah legislature had three types of
statutes in other states which could be used as guides
for enacting implementing legislation.
In Nevada the legislature limited the authority of the
Board of Examiners to the perfunctory duty of just
examining claims of two types: (1) A claim not supported by .an appropriation, and (2) A Claim supported
by an appropriation where the claim was unliquidated.
If the board failed to examine the unliquidated claim
within thirty days, the Comptroller could proceed without examination by the board. (Sec. 23-60, 61, Compiled
Laws of Nev.ada 1873)
In contrast, the Idaho statutes did not confine the
authority of the Board of Examiners to examination of
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just two types of claims, but gave it enlarged powers by
stating:
"The board may approve or disapprove any
claim or demand against the state or any item
thereof, or may recommend a less amount in payment of the whole or any item thereof, and a decision of the majority of the members shall stand
as the decision of the board." (Session Laws 1899,
Page 24, Sec. 3 ; Session Laws 1891, Page 46;
Codified Idaho Codes 1901, Sec. 344)
This broad statute obviously, influenced the Idaho Supreme Court, which in part distinguishes and explains
the Idaho cases.
The third type of statute and the one actually adopted in Utah was in the Laws of Montana. (Sec. 680,
Codes and Statutes of Montana, 1895) Similar laws were
enacted in California; (Sec. 654-685, Political Code 1886,
Calif.) however, when Utah copied these laws they added
the additional provisions authorizing the auditor to issue
warrants on monies expressly appropriated by statute.
It is clear that the first Utah Legislature intended to
follow a middle ground, and make their intent clear by
modifying the laws as enacted in Montana and California
to specifically exclude from the scope of examination of
the Board of Examiners monies expressly appropriated
by statute. Even without this exclusion the Montana and
California cases have so interpreted their laws.
C. The case law decided since statehood in other
states having similar provisions has limited the authority
of the Board of Examiners.
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Nevada, Montana and Califo;rnia have limited the
authority of the Board of Examiners. Idaho has refused
to render the State Board of Education as the Board of
Regents of the University of Idaho subservient to the
Board of Examiners.
The Defendants state that the Idaho, Nevada and
Utah cases constitut'e the weight of authority holding in
support of their contentions. It is the respondent's con.
tention, however, that the cases from California, Nevada
and Montana constitute the weight of authority, and that
the Idaho cases can be distinguished. A brief review of
the cases in the other jurisdictions show that the weight
of authority is consistent with the position now taken
by the respondent. The early Nevada case of Ash vs.
Parkinson supra and the second Nevada case of Lewis
vs. Doran, supra and the third case of State vs. Hallock,
supra have heretofore been discussed. (See page 12)
The Defendants attempt to distinguish the case of
Board of Trustees vs. Kenfield, supra on the ground
that it was a statutory agency rather than a constitutiona1
agency. This supposed distinction completely ignores the
fact that the court was construing the same language as
defined the authority and duties of the Utah Board of
Examiners. The case further specifically limits the definition of the word "claim." The definition there made
is consistent with the definition and limitation established in the early Nevada case of Ash r. Parkinson, supra.
The Montana Constitution (Section 20, Article 7)
directs the State Board of Examiners to examine all
28
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claims against the state. It is almost identical with the
Utah provision. A statutory provision (Section 262,
Montana Revised Code) says:
"The board of examiners may at any time,
when necessary, employ clerical help for any state
officer or board, and no clerks must be employed
by such officers or board without the authority
of the board of examiners, and no such clerks must
be employed by the board of examiners except
when all the duties of the officers cannot be performed by the officer himself."
These two provisions were construed in the case
of State v. Ounnningham, 101 Pac. 962, 33 Montana 165
(1909). In 1909 the Board of Examiners authorized the
employment of a stenographer at the rate of $150 per
month by the judges of the Supreme Court. The Legislature had appropriated an amount which would have permitted the payment of $200 per month for the stenographer who had been employed by the Supreme Court
since 1896, and who, since 1901, had been receiving pay
of $150 per month.
The issue was whether the Board of Examiners had
power and authority to specify the amount of payment
which would be made to the employee of the Supreme
Court. The suit was in mandamus to compel the auditor
to issue a warrant in the amount of $200 a month.
The court after citing the constitutional provisions
establishing the Board of Examiners and Section 262
Revised Code, cited above, stated as follows :
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"The result of this action, if it be held to be
of binding force, is that this court in some of its
important functions is subject to the control of
the state board of examiners; for to say that it
may grant the court permission to employ a stenographer is to say that in its discretion it may withhold permission. This means no more or less than
that, though the services of a stenographer are
absolutely necessary to the proper accomplishment of the work of the court - a fact about
which there can be no dispute - the board may in
its discretion cut off all such services, and thus
virtually disable the court, or at least seriously
impede and hamper it, in the discharge of its
duties. To say that it may fix the compensation
to be paid for each service is also an assertion
of the same power; for, if through mistake or
lack of knawledge, or from any other cause, if any
sttch exist, the board should fix the compensation
at such a figure as to render it impossible to secure suitable service, this would be attended by
the same consequence as if no cmnpensation were
allowed. The constitution of this state reserves
the powers of government in three distinct departments - the legislative, executive, and judicial. * * *"
The court then cites the section of the Constitution which
provides for the three deparhnents of government and
then further states with reference to said section as follows:
"It is within the knowledge of every intelligent man that its purpose is to constitute each
department an exclusive trustee of the power
vested in it, accountable to the people alone for
its faithful exercise, so that each may act as a
check upon the other, and thus may be prevented
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the tyranny and oppression which would be t-h'e
inevitable result of enlargement of all power in
the hands of one body. It is incumbent upon each
department to assert and exercise all its power
whenever public necessity requires it do so; otherwise, it is recreant to the trust reposed in it by
the people. It is equally incumbent upon it to refrain from asserting a power that does not belong
to it, for this is equally a violation of the people's
confidence. Indeed, the distinction goes so far
as to require each department to refrain from in
any way impeding the exercise or the proper functions belonging to either of the other departments."
The court then analyzed the duties required of a
stenographer employed by the court. Mention is made
of the particular qualifications required of such an employee, more particularly that he must be able to complete citations to cases, record testimony of witnesses
when any hearing is held before the court, and that the
employee has confidential information concerning deliberations and results of cases which require great care
to be exercised in selecting the person employed. It was
further stated as follows:
"In view of these considerations, it is manifest that the power to select the proper employee
could not with propriety be vested elsewhere than
in the court itself; and it is equally manifest that
the power to say whether it may or may not be
necessary to have assistance, and what the qualifications of the assistant shall be, may not be vested
elsewhere. If the power of appointment exists
at all, it is a nec~ssary power of the court, and,
since the qualifications of the individual desired
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is detennined in a measure by the amount of compensation paid for his services, the power to fix
the compensation is also a necessary power. In
short, the court has the inherent power to select
and appoint its own necessary assistants and make
the compensation due for their services a charge
against the state as a liquidated claim. Any other
conclusion would be to put the court in the attitude of a petitioner to the board of examiners
from time to time, and thus reduce it from its
position as a coordinate branch of the government
to the level of the ordinary citizen who desires
or claims payment for services rendered. * * •
"But the legislature could with no more propriety lodge in that department the power to appoint the employees of this court than it could
empower the court to appoint the employees of
the various executive offices. The provision of the
constitution, supra, cited as a justification for the
action of the board, has no application to a claim
such as the one here involved. Nor has Section
226, Revised Codes, which declares in the form of
a statute the prohibition embodied in the constitution. Both apply to unliquidated claims, and not
to those the amounts of which have been fixed
specifically by contract or by any department of
the government having authority to fix them."
Although the court in the above case is referring to
the judicial branch of government, its analysis of the
statute and constitutional provision has application here.
It does not require much imagination to visualize the end
result of the control of salaries of directors and employ
ees of the Board of Education by the Bo.ard of Examiners.
It is manifest that the power to select directors to carry
forward the educational super~sion of the Department
32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of Education cannot properly be vested elsewhere than
in the Board of Education. The Board is a constitutional
body created by the people. If the directors and employees of the Board of Education are compensated as the
Board of Examiners may determine, the constitutional
body is then placed in the position of a petitioner as any
ordinary citizen having an unliquidated claim against the
state.
The statutes of Montana appear to give broader
authority to the Board of Examiners over disbursements
of appropriated funds than the Utah statutes. The Supreme Court of Montana, notwithstanding, refused the
Board of Examiners control over the funds of an educational institution. One Montana statute (850 Revised
Codes of 1921) provided:
"The state board of examiners * * * shall
have supervision and control of all expenditures
of all moneys, appropriated or received for the
use of said (educational) institutions from any and
all sources, other than that received under and by
virtue of the acts of Congress * * * shall let all
contracts* * *and shall audit all claims to be paid
from any moneys, * * * but * * * shall have
authority to confer upon the executive boards of
such institutions such power and authority in contracting current expenses, and in auditing, paying, and reporting bills for salaries or other expenses incurred in connection with such institutions, as may be deemed by said state board of
examiners to be to the best interest of said institution."
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In the case of State vs. Erickson, 244 Pac. 287, 75
Montana 429, referring to these sections, the court said:
"These sections show the extent of the
authority of the board of examiners concerning
the expenditure of public funds. When the board
of examiners has exercised the powers conferred
upon it by the Constitution and legislative enactInents of the state, its functions are ended. State
es rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 101 P. 962, 39
Mont. 165; Porter v. Hartley 216 P. 344, 67 Mont.
244. While this board is given supervision and control over the expenditures of moneys appropriated or received for the use of the educational
institutions of the state, this power does not
authorize an arbitrary reduction by the board of
valid appropriations and authorized expenditures
from available funds applicable to such appropriations and expenditures which have been duly made
and authorized by the Legislative Assembly and
have received the approval of the Governor. Such
attempted substitution of the judgment of executive officers for that of the legaslative body constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which
cannot be permitted under our coru;titutional division of state government into its three co-ordinate
departments; the authority to do so was denied
the governor in the exercise of his veto power in
Mills vs. Porter, 222 P. -128, 69 )font. 325, 35
A.L.R. 592, and there is much less reason for
sustaining the exercise of such power by an executive board. When the Legislative Assembly has
expressed its solemn judgment as to the amount
necessary for the support and maintenance of an
institution for the fiscal year, and in doing so
has kept within the restrictions ilnposed by the
Constitution both as to such general appropriation and its appropriations generally for such
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year, the executive and judicial departments of
the state must bow to that judgment."
By statutory authority cited in the foregoing case,
the Board of Examiners is given broad and sweeping
authority over the funds appropriated for the use of the
educational institutions of that state. This statutory
authority is in addition to the constitutional provision
establishing the Board of Examiners. Yet, even under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the
Board of Examiners did not have authority to interfer.~
with the funds appropriated or expenditures authorized
by appropriation made by the Legislature.
The development of the Idaho cases and the Idaho
law is substantially different from any of the other states.
The Idaho Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
may review claims against the state in addition to the
Bo.ard of Examiners. The enabling legislation of the
State of Idaho was much broader than found in any other
state; a factor which obviously influenced the Idaho court
in its decisions.
The Idaho case prior to the adoption of the Utah
Constitution was Winters v. Ramsey, supra, decided in
January 1895. Then followed Pyke v. Stuenenberg, 5
Idaho 614, 51 Pac. 614 (1897) which started upon the
assumption that the claim had to be presented to the
Board of Examiners, and was brought to compel action
by said Board. The case followed shortly after this was
Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Idaho 288, 94 Pac. 438, which
involved an attempt by the auditor of the State of Idaho
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to employ two of his relatives in his office and to compel
payment to said relatives without having those claims
approved by the Board of Examiners. The court in this
case felt compelled to hold that the action by the auditor
should be subject to review by someone other than the
auditor himself, and held that the Board of Examiners
had that authority.
The Idaho Constitution is unlike ours in that it
provides that in addition to the Board of Examiners reviewing claims against the state, the Supreme Court shall
hear and determine claims against the state. Article V,
Section 10, of the Idaho Constitution provides :
"The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, but its
decision shall be merely recommendatory; no process in the nature of execution shall issue thereon; it shall be reported to the next session of the
legislature for its action."
Article IV, Sec. 18, of the Idaho Constitution, which
provides for the Board of Examiners, has been amended
twice by the people, thus incorporating the prior con
stitution which has not been the case in the State of
Utah. The first amendment was proposed by the Session
Laws, 1939, page 671, S.J.R. No. 7, and ratified at the
general election in 1940. The section was again amended
.as proposed by the Session Laws of 1945, page 398, H.J.R.
No. 3, and ratified at the general election in November,
1946.
Enabling legislature setting up and defining the
powers and duties of the Board of Examiners provided
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that the state auditor is ex officio secretary of the State
Board of Examiners.
Enabling legislation passed in 1899 (5th Session,
page 24, Sec. III; and Laws of 1891, 1st Session, page
46,) in defining the duties of the Board of Examiners
stated:
"The Board may approve or disapprove any
claim or demand against the state, or .any item
thereof, or may recommend a less amount in payment of the whole, or any item thereof, and a
decision of a majority of the members shall stand
as the decision of the Board."
However, even Idaho has not gone so far as to hold
that a claim against a constitutional body is one which
must be presented to the Board of Examiners. In the
case of State vs. State Board of Education, 196 Pac. 201,
33 Idaho 415 (1921), the Idaho court held that a claim
against the Board of Education as the Board of Regents
of the University of Idaho was not a claim against the
state such as would require approval of the Board of
Examiners. The authority granted the Board of Regents
was similar to the authority granted to the Intervenor in
that it provided that the general supervision, control and
direction of the University was delegaJted by the constitu~
tion to the Board of Education. So the Idaho cases cannot even be said, as to the facts of this case, that they are
contrary to the position taken by the respondent since
in the foregoing case it was held that as to a constitutional body with constitutional authority the definition
of claims would be restricted so as not to require examination and approval by the Board of Examiners.
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In view of the foregoing cases it is contended that the
Nevada, ~fontana, California and even Idaho cases support the contention of the Respondent and have limited
the authority of the Board of Examiners.
D. There is no specific statutory authority requiring approval of disbursements by the Board of Examiners.
The Defendants attempt to answer this assertion
under their Point II. In support of their position they
cite Sec. 53-3-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides in p.art as follows :
"At the end of each month the state superintendent shall file with the State Board of Examiners .an itemized account of his expenses, including those of the State Board of Education
verified by his oath."
In considering the foregoing section with other provisions of the l·aw for disbursement of funds, it is obvious
that the foregoing statute provides only for the review
of the personal expenses of the superintendent of public
instruction and the bo.ard members, as contrasted with
the disbursetnent of funds for institutions under the control of the State Board of Education. Sec. 64-1-16, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as follows:
"On the first day of each month, or as soon
thereafter as the bills for the expenses for the
previous montll have been audited, the governing
board of each state institution, • • • shall1nake a
requisition upon the state auditor for a warrant in
sufficient amount to pay the bills so audited, and
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thereupon the state auditor shall draw his warrant ag.ainst the appropriation made for such institution for the amount named in the requisition

... "

This section obviously applies to the disbursement of
funds appropriated by the legislature for the operation
of the various institutions under the control of the State
Board of Education, more particularly Weber College,
Dixie Junior College, Carbon College, the Vocational
Schools .and the Deaf and Blind Schools in the State of
Utah.
This section would also apply to the expenses for
materials and supplies and employees of the State Board
of Education. The section states that the governing
board shall audit the expenses for the previous month
and shall file the same with the .auditor who shall draw
a warrant against the appropriation made for such institution. Nowhere does it appe·ar that the Board of Examiners should examine the request for disbursements
of the institutions ag.ainst their specific appropriations.
At one time time the law did specifically provide
that ·the Board of ·Examiners should approve all requested disbursements against appropriations made to
the various institutions. Sec. 26-0-21, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, (Stipulation Count 2 and 3, P.ar. 22) provided:
"The State Board of Examiners shall not allow any demand payable out of any appropriations made to any state institution until the s.ame
is presented to the Board of Trustees or Board of
Control of such institution • • •. Copies of such
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bills in itemized form shall be transmitted monthly, together with a statement thereof approved
and verified by the proper officer or officers of
such institution, to the Board of Examiners for
its approval or disapproval."
Sec. 26-0-22, Revised Statutes of 1933, provided "the
State Auditor shall not draw his warrant to cover any
claim against any appropr~ation made until such claim
or claims have been approved by the Board of Examiners." The foregoing two sections were repealed by the
Laws of Utah, 1941. Second Special Session, Chapter
27, Sec. 3.
The legislature has specifically eliminated any requirement that the Board of Examiners approve warrants drawn on .appropriations before issuance by the
state auditor. The statute requiring approval by the
Board of Examiners has been specifically repealed. The
Respondent does not contest the authority of the Board
of Examiners to examine personal expenses of the state
superintendent and the board members. It is felt that
such a requiren1ent is reasonable since it provides for an
independent audit of these personal claims. However,
as to the other expenses of institutions under the control
of the Respondent, the board and the state superintendent audit those claims, in addition to the directors of
those institutions, thus giving the independent check
required to safeguard expendi,ture of public funds.
The same legislative history is shown with reference
to employing persGnnel by the State Board of Education.
Sec. 75-7-2, Revised Statutes, 1933, (Stipulation Count 1,
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Par. 3) provided that the State Board of Education upon
the recommendation of the state superintendent may
appoint a secretary of the board and "The salary of the
secretary shall be fixed by the board, subject to approval of the State Board of Examiners, and it shall
be paid from any money appropriated for that purpose."
Sec. 75-7-2, U.C.A. 1943, was amended eliminating the
specific approval of the Board of Examiners.
The present law, Sec. 53-2-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides
that the Board of Education:
"May appoint such assistant superintendents,
directors, supervisors, assistant, clerical workers
and other workers, as in the judgment of the board
may be necessary to the proper administration of
the public school system. The salary of such
assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors,
assistants, clerical workers and other employees
shall be fixed by the board and shall be paid from
money appropriated for that purpose." (Stipulation Par. 3)
For the Defendants to .argue that Sec. 53-3-9, U.C.A ~
1953, which provides for the submission of the personal
expenses of the superintendent and members of the
State Board of Education is sufficiently broad to grant
to the Board of Exarniners statutory authority to approve or disapprove expenditures of the State Board of
Education generally, completely ignores Sec. 64-1-16,
U.C.A., 1953, cited .above, pertaining to the drawing of
vouchers for expenses by the governing board of state
institutions for previous months and completely ignores
the legislative history whereby prior approval of the
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Board of Examiners has been specifically eliminated by
the legislature.
The fact that Sec. 53-3-9 requires Board of Examiner approval and Sec. 64-1-16 does not, shows that if the
legislature so intended they could have provided for
approval by the Board of Examiners. It is, therefore,
clear that the Board of Examiners does not have any
statutory authority requiring approval or disapproval
by said Board for the disbursement of funds appropriated by the legislature to the Board of Education for the
maintenance of institutions under its general control
and supervision.
E. Reasonable construction of the Utah Constitution requires that each section be given effect.
To interpret the section creating the Board of Examiners in the manner asserted by the Attorney General
and Board of Examiners would tend to nullify the othei"
provisions of the constitution, more particularly the
section creating the three departments of government
and the se0tion empowering and authorizing the State
Board of Education to supervise and oontrol the public
school system. Such an interpretation is contrary to the
uniform rule of construction that an interpretation will
be adopted which will give effect to all provisions of a
constitution or statute.
Defendants' brief answering the University of Utah
discusses and relies upon the above mentioned rule of
interpretation. The Defendants stated:
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"It is also well established that a constitution must be examined as a whole giving full effect, whenever possible, to every provision.''
The Defendants ,then cite a lengthy quotation in support of that proposition from Cooley's Constitutional
Lim~tations. Although the Defendants rely upon this
argument in support of their answer to the Plaintiff,
they have completely ignored and failed to answer the
application of this argument, as asserted by the Respondent. If the Board of Education is to have general control and supervision of the public school system, it cannot
be hopelessly subordinated to the Board of Examiners
in the employment of personnel, expenditure of funds,
and in other ways as shown by the exhibit in this action.
The Defendants state that it is only the money spending power of the Board of Education that the Board of
Examiners supervises and "this does not qualify the
powers of the Board of Education." (Page 49) Even the
Idaho courts which have gone furthest in sustaining
broad power in the Board of Examiners has recognized
that where the Constitution granted to the State Ba,ard
of Education as Regents of the University of Idaho general supervision and control of the University to
"Confer upon the Board of Examiners power
to pass upon claims against the Board of Regents,
would make the latter board subservient to the
former, and in the final analysis would operate
to deprive the Board of Regents of the control
and direction of the funds of an appropriation
to the University." State v. State Board of Education, supra.
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The exhibits filed in this action are conclusive of the
fact that the Board of Examiners have exercised com.
plete control over the Board of Education by virtue of
supervising expenditure of funds. Such control is exercised to such an extent the Board of Education cannot
even employ janitors on a temporary basis on up to employment of directors of institutions, creation of research departments, etc., without first securing approval
of the Board of Examiners.
The Defendant cannot consistently argue that as to
the University of Utah all sections of the Constitution
should be given effect, and yet as to the Board of Educa.
tion the section establishing the Board of Examiners
should have precedence over the section establishing and
defining the duties of the Board of Education.
The Appellant under Point 4, has chosen to interpret
and take issue with a selected statement made by the trial
judge which is not determinative of this case. Whether
the educational department of the state government is or
is not classified as a fourth branch of government is not
the important issues. Likewise, the issue here presented
is not "Can the people by constitutional amendment
modify the vesting of authority in the Board of Education~" Educ.ation has been of paramount importance in
the State of Utah. It received considerable attention at
the Constitutional Convention, and was separately treated
in the Constitution.
The issue here is one of constitutional construction,
of whether one board created by the constitution shall be
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permitted to dominate another constitutional agency. The
trial court, in rationalizing the intent of the framers of
the constitution and the two sections involved, points out
the vesting of control in the Board of Education not the
chief executive or any other official. The Board of Education makes no claim that it is not subject to the laws
of the Legislature, providing such laws are not in conflict with constitutional- provisions.
In view of the Respondents' position that the Board
of Examiners has no authority over claims originating
with a state agency or that the authority of the Board
of Examine,rs, if any, is limited to the performance of
ministerial duties, it is not necessary to extend this brief
by discussing the particular meaning of the exception
"salaries or compensation fixed by law." Reference is
made to the able discussion of this issue contained in the
opinion of the tdal judge.
F. The specific authority of the Board of Education should have precedence over the incidental and
general authority of the Board of Examiners.
The State Board of Education is given the specific
and primary duty of supervising the educational system
of the state, while the Board of Examiners are given the
authority to examine claims only as an incidental or
secondary duty.
The Defendants completely ignore the foregoing
proposition and make no attempt to answer the s~ame
in their brief. Rather, they take the position that the
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Board of Examiners not only have the power, but must,
ex.amine all claims and disbursements against the state.
Such a position as a practical matter is illogical. The
early Nevada case of Lewis v Doron, supra, recognized
that a pra0tical· interpretation of the authority of the
Board of Examiners must be given stating:
"It must be remembered that this board is
composed of state officers, having other high and
responsible duties imposed and powers given by
the constitution-this matter of examining claims
being only an addition thereto ; so if there be
any force, any argument that they are rendered
subordinate, still such subordination is in only one
particular, outside the special powers pertaining
to their general official position."
All of the arguments advanced by the Nevada Court
apply with equal force to the present case. If it were not
thought feasible to burden the three top state officials
with the full responsibility of approving all disbursement of funds in 1870, it cannot logically be maintained
that in practice such officials should be compelled to
perform such collateral duties under present-day conditions.
The provision creating the Board of Examiners is as
though it were an amendment or an afterthought, being
attached to the section of the Constitution creating the
Board of State Prison Con1n1issioners. If the framers
intended to cre.ate an all-powerful board, having authority over all appropriated funds, the section accomplish·
ing such a purpose would have received some specific
discussion at the Constitutional Convention and would
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have been stated separately and not as an appendage to
a group of miscellaneous sections creating administrative agencies to function "until otherwise provided by
law."
G. The nine members of the Board of Education are
direct representatives of the people, having been elected
by them.
The nine members of the State Board of Education are elected by the people and accountable to the
people.
The Defendants ignore this fact and contend the
Governor should have authority to exercise budgetary
control being responsive to the people. They argue:
''Cries of destruction of constitutional government are not only ran overstatement but completely false. In fact, constitutional government
is strengthened for the responsibility for excessive expenditures or too drastic decreases in funds
is placed directly on the governor. Public opinion
and the exercise of the vote can thus operate not
only on the Governor but on the legislature to
modify the powers granted. This is constitutional
government. Insulation of bureaucrats from the
electorate and their indifference to public opinion
is rHpl,aced by ra system responsive to public
demands and requirements.''
This argument sounds in politics not law; but considered as political it also fails.
The Supreme Court in the other phase of this lawsuit involving the University of Utah recognized that
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a distinction should be made where a Board of Regents
was appointed as contrasted to a Board of Regents
elected by the people. This distinction was relied upon
to distinguish the constitutions of Michigan and Colorado
as compared to the constitution of the State of Utah.
H. There are other adequate safeguards for the
disbursement of public funds.
It is the Respondent's contention that disbursement
of funds duly appropriated by the Legislature to the
Respondent for disbursement are not subject to the
review of the Board of Examiners. The Board of Examiners or such other agency as is delegated to review
miscellaneous and incidental claims has no authority to
interfere with the administration of the policies of specific agencies equally accountable to the people as the
Board of Education. There are sufficient accounting
procedures to insure that the funds are disbursed for
public purposes and that the funds are adequately appropriated for the expenditures made.
The Respondent does not contend that it cannot be
required to submit its claims for a pre-audit to determine
if they are for public purposes ·and within its appropriation. The Respondent is called upon to prepare
budgets in advance and to submit its accounts to both
a pre-audit and a post-audit.
Section 63-6-19, U.C.A. 1953, (Par. 23, Count 2 of
the Stipulation) specifically prohibits any board or
commission from authorizing expenditures in excess of
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their appropriations and further provides that so· to do
would subject the members to a criminal complaint
charging a misdemeanor.
Section 67-10-1, (Par. 26, Count 2, Stipulation) specifies that all of the boards and commissions of the state
shall file biannual reports setting out in detail under
oath the manner in which all appropriations have been
expended.
Section 5, Article 7 of the Constitution outlining
the duties of the Governor specifically provides that the
Governor may require from any officer or executive
department any information relating to its condition,
management and eX'penses.
Certainly all of these provisions set up an adequate
safeguard for the expenditure of public funds to insure
honest handling of public funds and public airing of
expenditures of the Board of Education. All of these
safeguards are completely ignored by the Defendants,
and it is then insisted that greater protection is needed
for state funds, and that the Board of Examiners must
examine all expenditures before the money is paid. A
claim· only arises when a demand for payment of money
is presented. The absurd position of Defendant's contention is that the Board of Education may receive
supplies and materials, may accept services, may enter
into contracts, may instigate policies, and after the
services have been performed, materials received and
payment is to be made, at that time a claim arises
which must be examined by the Board of Examiners
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before payment can be made. We then have the ridiculous situation of a Board of Education with power to
contract but not power to perform, with power to agree
upon terms of payment, but with no power to insure
payment. Numerous instances appear in Exhibit 2.
Must it be presumed that the framers of our constitution found that the balance of integrity rests with
Appellants 1
I. The statutory authority of the Board of Examiners does not contemplate review of disbursements
authorized by the Legislature through the Board of
Education.
It is only logical that some agency be authorized to
review miscellaneous personal claims against the state.
If the amount is unliquidated or evidence is required,
some claims tribunal must investigate into the matter and
verify the claims for payment if an appropriation has
been made or to make a recommendation to the Legislature for an appropriation if none has been made. It is
illogical to require review by the Governor, Secretary
of State, and Attorney General of all payments of money
authorized for specific purposes by agencies specifically
authorized by the Constitution and to whom an appropriation has been made by the Legislature. Certainly
the Nevada decisions made such a practical interpretation
and the Utah legislature so intended when it provided
that monthly bills be approYed by the goyerning board
which incurred the obligations and then warrants would
be drawn by the auditor. (Sec. G-1-1-16, lT.C.A. 1953)
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The state needed some court of claims or agency
to review miscellaneous and incidental claims which
may be presented by people who felt that they were
entitled to some relief at the expense of the state. Such
a body could be of great service in sifting facts and
investigating the demands and in those cases where no
appropriation had been certifying those facts to the
Legislature for its consideration. Similar claims of a
miscellaneous and incidental nature for which an appropriation had been made if they were not within the usual
and normal jurisdiction of other branches of the government should likewise be determined by a board having
the authority generally to hear such claims and to determine that they were just and proper.
After the constitutional provisions were determined,
the Legislature in 1896 enacted the following three sections which implemented the provisions of Section 13 of
Article VII.
The claims for which an appropriation has been
made are dealt with in Section 63-6-7 which provides:
''Any person having a claim against the state
for which an app,ropriation has been made may
present the same to the Board in the form of
an account or petition * * * and the Board must
allow or reject the same in the order of its presentation.'' * • *
The second type of claim against the state is dealt
with in Section 63-6-10, which provides:

"If no appropriation has been 'made for the
payment of any claim presented to the board,
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the settlement of which is provided for by law,
or if an appropriation made has been exhausted,
the board must audit the claim, and, if it is
approved, must transmit it to the Legislature
with a statement of the reasons for the approval."
(Emphasis added.)
The third type of claim against the state is dealt
with in Sections 63-6-11, 63-'6-12, 63-6-13, and 63-6-14.
Section 63-6-11 provides:
''Any person having a claim against the state,
the settlement of which is not otherwise provided
for by law, must present the same to the Board
of Examiners, accompanied by a statement
showing the facts constituting the claim, verified
in the same manner as complaints in civil
actions.'' (Emphasis added)
The method of examination of claims is set forth in
Section 63-6-13 as follows :
''The board must at the time designated proceed to examine and adjust all such claims, and
may hear evidence in support of or against them,
and shall report to the Legislature such facts
and recommendations concerning them as it may
think proper. In making its recommendations the
board may state and use any official or personal
knowledge which any member of the board may
have touching such claims. ''
By the foregoing sections the Legislature has provided for a comprehensive plan in the three situations
above named. There ~s no specific provision nor is
there language from which it may be implied that the
Board of Examiners has the ·power to deny the expendi-
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ture by the Board of Education of appropriated funds
(when said funds are unexpended).
The foregoing statutory provisions were copied
from the law as it existed in Montana and California
pertaining to the authority of the Board of Examiners.
(Sec. 680, Codes and Statutes of Montana, 1895, Sec.
663, Political Code of California, 1872.) Neither Nevada
nor Idaho followed this classification and type of statute
defining the authority of the Board of Examiners. The
case of State Library vs. Kenfield, supra, the California
court held that disbursements by the Trustees for the
State Library were not subject to approval or included
in the definition of claims to be submitted to the Board
of Examiners. In Montana, in addition to the foregoing
statutory authority, there was a statute granting to the
State Board of Examiners supervision and control of
all expenditures of monies appropriated or received
for the use of educational institutions. (850, Revised
Codes Montana, 1921.) In spite of this additional statutory authority the Montana court held that the Board
of Examiners does not have authority to interfere with
the funds appropriated or expenditures authorized by
appropriations made by the legislature to the educational
institutions.
Therefore, it appears that in the other two states
having similar statutory authority, both states have construed these statutes as not being intended to cover
disbursements of funds appropriated by a legislature to
a specific agency of the government.
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If the statutes were not intended to apply to these
types of disbursements, then it is logically asked what
type of claims were to be presented to the Board of
Examiners. The framers of the Idaho Constitution intended the Board of Examiners to be just a Board of
Claims as is shown from the following excerpt from the
Debates and Proceedings, Idaho Constitutional Convention:
MR. HEYBURN. Now, I renew my amendment to section 18, which is to strike out all after
the word 'law' in line 3. The reason is that in
the report of the Judiciary committee, Section
11 (10), it is provided that 'the supreme court
shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims
against the state, but its decision shall be merely
recommendatory; no process in the nature of
execution shall issue thereon; they shall be reported to the next session of the legislature for
its action.' This Section 18 provides that 'they
shall also constitute a board of examiners, with
power to examine all claims against the state,
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed
by law. And no clain1 against the state, except
salaries and compensation of officers fixed by
law, shall be passed upon by the legislature "Without first having been considered and acted upon
by said board.' \Y e should make rules to be considered by this board and the supreme c.ourt
and ·we ought to confer jurisdiction upon one body
or the other. If we are going to \est it in this
board, there is no necessity to -vest it in the
supreme court; and if it is to be vested in the
supreme court, there is no necessity to have it
vested in this board. There is no necessity to
hear those claims twice. It deprives the legislature of the power to pass upon them until they
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· have been passed upon by this board under Section
18. Section 11 (10) of the Judiciary Committee
provides that the supreme court shall act in this
matter.
''MR. AINSLIE. If the gentleman will examine the sections in the .Judiciary ·article and the
one in this article, he will find no conflict at all.
Section 18 only makes them a board of examiners,
'with power to examine all claims against the
state, except salaries or compensation of officers
fixed by law, and perform such other duties as
may he prescribed by law.' In Section 11 ( 10)
the party who has claims against the state can
commence suit in the supreme court. 'The supreme
court shall have original jurisdiction to hear
claims against the state, but its decision shall he
merely recomrnendatory.' Now, these claimants
originally can commence suit in the supreme court,
and then the matter must be certified to the legislature, and it will allow it. The supreme court in
Section 11 (10) of the Judiciary bill is exactly
like the court of claims in Washington. In the
treasury department they have different powers;
the first, second, third and fourth auditors, the
comptroller of claims, etc. ; and all claims go to
one of these officers. If the examiner for instance
is the comptroller, and he rejects the claim, the
claimant then has the right to sue in the court of
claims to recover the amount. And that is the
condition here. The governor, attorney general
and secretary of sta,te constitute a Board of
Claims, and if they allow it there is no necessity
to go into court, if they reject it, then they go
into court.'' Vol. 1, Proceedings & Debates, Idaho
Constitutional Convention, page 1427.
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The Defendants argue that the authority of the
Board of Examiners cannot be confined to claims of
a miscellaneous and incidental nature for which an appropriation has been made. The Defendants stated:
"It is difficult to conceive such a situation
for the legislature is prohibited from passing on
a claim, that is, appropriating money to pay an
individual's claim before the Board of Examiners
has acted.''
There may be many instances when it is recognized
by the state that there is a duty to compensate various
individuals as a result of action on the part of the
state. The amounts to be paid to any individual may
not be known. The legislature then may appropriate
a lump sum to be disbursed to people coming within
the classification for whom the appropriation is made.
As an example, the leases to the Beehive Midways,
Inc., at the State Fair Ground and the construction
carried ·on there was held void. Many people as a result
had claims against the state. The legislature in 1951
appropriated $60,000 to the Beehive Midways, Inc., et
al, to be paid in settlement of those claims.
There is an example of an -appropriation being made
to settle specific claims, but those claims had to be
adjudicated or determined so that all of the claims
could be settled for the amount involved. This is one
type of claim which the Board of Examiners has jurisdiction to consider. The statute seems to have that type
of ·situation specifically in mind when it states: "Any
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person having a claim against the state for which an

appropriation has been made may present the same to
the Board in the form of an account or petition.'' Certainly there must be some agency of the state which
can review miscellaneous and incidental claims of the
state and if an appropriation has been made, authorize
payment, and if an appropriation has not been made
or has been exhausted then they can be reviewed and
recommended to the legislature.
Numerous such claims are considered at each session of the legislature. A glance at any appropriations
act will show a long list of miscellaneous claims referred
to them by the Board of Examiners. Included are claims
of a tort nature where the state has not authorized itself
to be sued. Others would be contract cases where the
contracts have been declared void and there is a moral
duty on the part of the state to reimburse or to pay in
. compliance with the contract. There may be cases where
the state has sold property to which they did not have
a title and the only basis for a return of the money by
the purchaser is a claim to the Board of Examiners.
These are many and frequent such incidental miscellaneous personal claims which must be passed upon by
some reviewing board before presentation to the legislature.
There were eleven members of the Constitutional
Convention who were present in the 1896 legislature.
At that time in the general Appropriations Act after
specifying the amounts to each of the state institutions
in Section 2, Chapter 128, it was provided:
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"It is hereby declared unlawful for any state
officer or state board of any of the institutions of
the state to contract any indebtedness in excess
of the appropriation herein provided, except by
and with the consent of the State Board of Examiners, previous to the contraction of such indebtedness.''
Similar requirements are presently contained in Section 63-6-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Implicit within
that section is the proposition that any state officer or
state board may contract indebtedness for which appropriations have been made. If such were not the case,
ther.e would be no reason for the limitation contained
in Section 2.
In 1899 Section 2070 of the Revised Statutes of
Utah 1898 was amended to read as follows:
"On the first day of each month, or as soon
thereafter as the bills for the expenses of the
previous month have been audited, the Board of
Control of each state institution, or the proper
committee thereof, duly authorized by the Board
for such purposes, shall n1ake a requisition upon
the State Auditor for a warrant in sufficient
amount to pay the bills so audited, and thereupon
the state auditor shall draw his warrant against
the appropriation made for such institution for
the amount named in the requisition, in favor of
the treasurer of the governing board of the institution, or in case of the State Prison, in favor
of the warden thereof. To obtain such warrant,
the treasurer of the Board or the warden must
·present to the State Auditor a written authorization from the Board.''
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The law as therein stated has been substantially
the same since that time and is now contained in Section
64-1-16, U.C.A., 1953. The foregoing section does not
state or infer that authorization by the Board of Examiners must also be secured before funds are withdrawn.
Rather the section is mandatory in that the auditor
shall draw his warrant against the appropriation. If the
Legislature had intended a review by the Board of Examiners, they could have easily so provided as they did
with reference to personal expenses of the superintendent of public instruction and the members of the Board
of Education wherein it was specifically provided that
such expenses must be reviewed by the Bo,ard of Examiners before payment.
Section 18, Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1896, copied
verbatim from the Montana political code, Section 680
Codes and Statutes of Montana 1895, with the exception
of the clause underlined defined the duties of the Board
of Examiners as follows :
"The state auditor shall not draw his warrant for any claim unless it has been approved by
the Board, except for salaries or com'pensation
of officers fixed by law, or for monies expressly
appropriated by statute. (Emphasis added)
In view of the foregoing statutes, a usual rule of
construction supports the contention that the legislature
did not intend that the Board of Examiners should
approve expenditures made by a specific Board or
agency consistent within the appropriation made by the
Legislature.

59
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J. The Utah ca•ses have not yet decided to what
extent the Board of Examiners may review the disbursements and expenditures of the Board of Education.
No Utah case has been decided by the Supreme
Court which involves the power of the Board of Examiners to pass upon disbursem·ents authorized by a constitutional agency. In considering the Utah cases respondent contends that the Board of Education is a constitutional body and under the decided cases in Nevada,
Idaho and Montana, is created by an act of the same
dignity as that creating the Board of Examiners. That
to ascribe to the Board of Examiners any power and
authority which would circumscribe or interfere with
the responsibility of the Board of Education to assume
the general control and supervision over the public
school system would be violative of the constitutional
provision creating the Board of Education.
The Utah Supreme Court first considered Section
13, Article 7 of the Constitution creating the Board of
Examiners in the case of Thoreson ·vs. State Board of
Examiners, 21 Utah 187, 60 Pac. 982 (1900). The Legislature appropriated funds for repayment of amounts
paid by lessees pursuant to leases authorized by an act
of the Territorial Legislature of the State of Utah
which had been declared void. On rehearing the Board
of Examiners maintained that the appropriations act
was unconstitutional since it provided for the payment
of claims which had not fi.rst been presented to the
Bqard of 'Examiners for their approval prior to the
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Legislature passing the act in question. In considering
this case the court said :
''The Board of Examiners are required to
perform the duties mentioned in said section of
the Constitution, and· also to perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law, therefore the
only duties in the premises imposed upon the
Board of Examiners, are such as Section 963 of
the revised statutes prescribes. In our former
opinion we held that the only discretionary power
which the Board of Examiners had in the matter
was to ascertain whether or not respondent's
assignor had paid on a lease made in pursuance
of the void act of the Territorial Legislature, the
sum claimed by the respondent, and it having
been admitted that said sum had been so paid,
that such payment was therefore a just claim
within the meaning of said section of the statute,
and that said Board of Examiners had no right
to reject said claim on the ground that Section
963 of the Revised Statutes was a violation of the
Constitution, but that it became and was amandatory duty of the said board to receive audit, and
allow said claim, and that mandamus lies to enforce the performance of that ministerial duty.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Miner discusses
for the first time the language contained in Section 13,
Article 7, "until otherwise provided by law."
"By Section 13, Article 7, of the Constitution,
the Board of Examiners were authorized, unt,il
otherwise provided by law, to examine all claims
against the state, except for salaries, etc., and
they were authorized to perform such other duties
as may be prescribed by law."
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Thereafter Justice Miner sets out particularly the
provisions of the section of the revised statutes involved
and then further states :
"By the Constitution the Board were to examine all claims against the State until otherwise provided by law, and were also to perform
such other duties as might be provided by law.
'" * *
''The power to allow a just claim is given
by the act and is authorized by the Constitution.
Until otherwise provided by law the Board were
to act under the constitution. Until otherwise provided by law no claim against the State, except
salaries, etc., could be passed upon by the legislature, without having been considered and acted
upon by the Board, but the board were to perform such other duties as might be provided by
law and Section 963 was enacted in pursuance of
the provision in the Constitution.''

In State v. Edwards, 33 Utal1 243, 93 Pac. 720, (1908)
an action was brought by a court reporter against
the state auditor seeking a writ of mandate directing
the auditor to pay a mileage claim approved by the district judge as provided by the statute. The auditor
demurred to the petition on the ground that there was
no allegation that the clailn had been presented to the
Board of Examiners as required by Section 13 of Article
7 of the Constitution.
The court did not discuss or cite the case of Thoreson
·vs. State Board of E.ra miners, supra. It had before it
the question as to whether or not the claim for mileage
as fixed by contract must fhst be presented to the
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Board of E)raminers. There was not pending before the
court the question as to whether or not mandamus
would lie against the Board of Examiners for the performance of a minsterial duty or any other duty. The
court ,said by way of dicta:
''No doubt the Board of Examiners, in a
proper ease may be subject to a proceeding in
mandamus.''
The authority of the Board of Examiners as parties
to the action was construed in two cases. The first case
was State vs. Cutler, 95 Pac. 1071, 34 Utah 99. This was
an action brought by a court reporter seeking to recover
mileage. The claim had been presented to the Board of
Examiners which refused payment on the grounds that
the general appropriation bill of 1907 passed by the
Legislature limited payment of mileage to that actually
expended by the court reporter. The court directed the
State Board of Examiners to audit and allow the claim.
The court said at Page 108:
"In view of the conceded facts, there is
nothing upon whi,ch the respondents can legally
exercise any discretionary powers in this case,
and therefore they should have audited and
allowed the claim. No doubt they would have done
so had they not entertained a view of the law
different from the one we feel constrained to
take. In such a case it is clear that the law in
effect directs what the action of the board shall
be, and, this being so, there is no reason why the
board of examiners should not be required to
comply with what it commands. There would be
something lacking in our system of government
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or jurisprudence if under such circumstances a
claimant could be defeated simply because the
officer or board required to audit and allow his
claim exercised some discretion in the matter.
Where the duty to act is dear, and the law gives
a right to obtain payment of a claim owing by
the state, courts should not hesitate to enforce the
right by mandamus. It follows, therefore, that
the relator is entitled to have his claim for mileage
as set forth in his petition audited and allowed
·by the respondents as the state board of Examiners.''
In the case of M arioneaux vs. Cutler, 91 Pac. 355,
32 Utah 475 (1907) an action was brought for a writ
of mandamus against the Board of Examiners on a claim
for mileage presented by a District Judge. The Board
of Examiners refused to audit and allow the claim upon
the sole ground that they were advised and believed
that there was no law of the state authorizing the allowance thereof, and therefore rejected the claim. No particular mention was made of the authority of the Board
of Examiners in this regard, it apparently being conceded that the Board of Examiners would have discretion
to disallow a claim if there were no supporting law for
the presentment thereof. The court examined the law
with reference thereto and concluded that a 1901 law
allowing mileage had been repealed by implication by a
law of 1903. And therefore sustained the action of the
Board of Examiners.
The most recent case of significance decided by the
Utah Supreme Court involYing the authority of the
Board of Examiners is the case of Uintah State Bank
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vs. Ajax, State Auditor, 297 Pac. 434, 77 Utah 455,
(1931). This is a proceeding before the Supreme Court
seeking by mandamus to compel the State Auditor to
issue warrants on the State Treasurer in favor of the
Uintah State Bank on account of certain .bounty certificates issued by the county clerk of Uintah County to
Viarious persons and assigned by them to the Bank. The
Bank alleged all of the necessary requirements of the
bounty law having been compiled with by the assignor
of the claims and that the bounty statute provided that
the Auditor is required to draw a warrant in favor of the
person entitled to the same upon the State Treasurer in
the amount shown by the certificate to be due. It is admitted that all of the requirements were met and that the
nineteen claims are all identical. The only que,stion is
whether or not the claim must first be approved by the
Board of Examiners before being pre'Sented to the Auditor. The bounty act nowhere required that the claim be
pres·ented to the Board of Examiners.
The court quoted Section 13, Article 7 of the Constitution providing for a Board of Examiners and said:
"Pursuant to this constitutional provision
the legislature has more particularly specified
the duties of the Board of Examiners in Title
29, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917."
In Section 2471 of Title 29 it is provided:

"Any person having a claim against the state
for which an appropriation has been made may
present the same to the Board in the form of an
account or petition.''
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Based upon this statute the court found that the
B·ank 's claim came within the statute and denied the
argument that it was not subject to the approval of the
Board of Examiners. This statutory enactment of the
Utah Legislature fulfills the constitutional requirement
"until otherwise provided by law," upon which statute
the Ajax case depends.
J usti~ce Straup wrote an extensive dissenting opinion
concurred in by Justice Ephraim Hanson. He pointed
out that the claim for bounty was under a statute which
was complete and which in effect produced a liquidated
claim which should be paid by the State Auditor. In sup'POrt of this position that the statute refers only to
unliquidated claims, he cited the Idaho and Xevada cases
interpreting the constitutional provisions to so apply
and said that the court in the majority virtually found
the claim in this case to be unliquidated. It was the
opinion of Judge Straup that:
''What the court decided with respect to
such a claim constitutes an adjudication and a
precedent of binding effect as to unliquidated
claims. 'What was said beyo·nd thai, 1cas mere
dicta without binding effect. Callahan v. Salt Lake
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863. While all members
of the court concurred in the opinion, yet such
does not constitute a concurrence in everything
stated or discussed in the opinion or even as to
all of the reasoning· therein. The discussion of the
questions and conclusions reached essential to a
proper disposition of the case were that of the
court; but in concurring therein, it is not to be
understood that everything stated in the opinion
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was necessarily adopted as the opinion of the
court.''
The State Board of Education takes the same view
of the case. There is no direct holding in any Utah case
where the Board of Examiners have been sustained in
their refusal to allow a claim against the State authorized by a constitutional body where funds have been
appropriated to pay such claims.
The Defendants in their brief would cause this
court to believe that the issues here raised have been previously decided in these three cases.
In the Edwards case, the court concluded its orpinion
as follows:
''In view that the writ must he denied for
the reasons stated, we cannot now pass upon the
other questions raised by the respondent. The
Board of Examiners whose duty it is under the
constitution to pass upon the claim is not before
us ; and thence would not be concluded by a decision upon these questions.''
The Ajax case merely reaffirms the holding in the
Edwards case.
The holding in these two earlier cases is not and
should not be binding in this case for the following
reasons:
1. The decisions in the cases were based in part
upon the construction of statutory law substantially
different from the laws applicable to this case. In the
Edwards case the court cited specifically Sec. 946, Revised Statutes of 1898, pertaining to authority of the
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auditor to draw his warrant only after approval of the
Board of Examiners. That the decision in the Edwards
case was i nfact based in part upon statutory construction is shown by the following excerpts from the Ajax
case:
''This court had occasion to construe these
provisions of the statute and of the constitution
in the case of State vs. Edwards."
And another place the court said:
"It follows, therefore, from the constitution

and statutes as thus construed, that the bounty
cl'aims or certificates in question must be presented to and approved by the Board of Examiners * * *."
As previously discussed, the Board of Examiners
does not have any specific statutory authority to review
disbursements of the Board of Education except for
the personal expenses of the State superintendent and
members of the board. In addition, Sec. 946, Revised
Statutes of 1898 had an additional exclusion which was
not considered to be applicable in the Edwards or Ajax
case, and was, therefore, not considered by the court
in its opinion. This exclusion, as previously mentioned,
excludes monies expressly a'Ppropriated by law from
being first approved by the Board of Examiners before
the state auditor may draw a warrant for disbursement
thereof.
2. Neither of the cases involved a constitutional
agency exercising its specific authority.
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The primary duty of the county clerk is not to
audit and adjudicate factual issues relative to the killing
of predatory animals. Nor is the primary duty of· the
distr.ict judge to make and adjudicate contracts for
mileage payments. However, it is the specific duty of
the Board of Education to supervise and control the
public school system ~of the state. More particularly,
specific institutions are directly controlled by the Board
of Education~ For these institutions specific appropriations are made to the Board of Education for disbursement as directed by said board.
3. Neither the Edw~ards case nor the Ajax case
involved the disbursement of funds after approval had
been given by a multi-member board or agency. In both
the Aj'ax and the Edwards case the claim was presented
to just one person, who certified the same to the auditor,
demanding payment without any other examination. The
puJblic policy reasons for holding in such a case that
the Board of Education should review the claim do not
apply in this case.
4. There is no inconsistency in holding that a bounty
claim must be pres en ted to the Board of Examiners,
but that a disbursement authorized by the Board of Education need not be examined by the Board of Examiners.
Such was the holding in two California cases. In
the case of Ingram vs Colgan, 106 California 113, 38 Pac.
315, the California couTt held that a claim for a bounty
payment had to be examined by the Board of Examiners.
However, the California court held in the case of State
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vs. Kenfield, supra, that a disbursement by the Board
of Trustees of the State Library drawn upon funds
appropriated ·by the legislature was not such a claim
as required review by the Board of Examiners. The
Utah Court in the Ajax case cited as a supporting
authority Ingram ·vs. Colgan, supra. The very quotation
from the California case cited by the Utah Supreme
Court indicates that the word "claim" can have a
technical definition. Part of the quote is as follows:
"Whatever the rule may be in cases which
do not come within the te·chnical definition of the
word 'claim,' we are of the opinion that, if any
force is to be given to this section in any case, it
applies to the present one.''
Two of the five Utah judges felt that even bounty
claims need not be presented to the Board of Examiners.
5. Neither the Edwards case nor the Ajax case
discussed:
(a) the case law as it existed prior to the adoption of our constitution.
(b) the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention and the effect of the amendment
"until otherwise provided by law."
(c) the issue of the control by the Board of
Examiners of the Board of Education compris·ed of elective officials with specific constitutional duties.
(d) the nullifications of one section of the con70
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stitution by overemphasizing· the power
granted by another section thereof.
(e) ,a legislative history establishing prior statt~tory authority requiring approval by the
Board of Examiners with such authority
subsequently being specifically withdrawn.
6. Neither of the cases involved the Board of Examiners as a par'ty to the action. Consequently there
was no issue raised requiring a holding defining the
power and authority of the Board of Examiners.
The facts and issues presented in this case are so
dissimilar to the facts and issues raised in the Edwards
and Ajax cases that even assuming that the dicta in
the cases had persuasive effect the discussion therein
could not be held applica;ble to this case. As Justice
Straup in the Ajax case said, after pointing out that
discussions unnecessary to an adjudication of the case
constituted mere dicta without binding effect:
''Every opinion or decision must be read
and considered in the light of the facts upon
which it is based and in view of the particular
question or questions presented for decision. They
constitute the foundation of the entire structure
which cannot safely be used without reference
to them. Attempts to pick out parts of an opinion
without reference to the facts upon which it was
based and apply them indiscriminately in other
cases is bound to result in confusion and wrong
results.''
The Defendants are indiscriminately picking and
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choosing from an opinion when they- rely upon a recital
contained in the statement of the case in State Board
of Education v. Commission of Finance, Utah (1952)
247 P. 2d 435, in support of their position. Tl1e
Defendants admit on page 10 of their brief that the
principal question in that case was the legality of the
composition of the Board of Education. True, the attorney general did make the statement in his brief that
the Board of Examiners had authority as contended
herein. The very fact that the attorney general's office
has taken the position as herein asserted by the Defendants was the reason the Board of Education felt required to employ separate counsel to present this issue
and challenge the supposed authority of the Board of
Examiners.
The facts in this case, unlike any other presented
to this court, clearly show that the State Board of Education cannot supervise and control the public school
system as required by the Constitution and be subject
to the present conduct of the Board of Examiners. It
now is completely subordinate to and dominated by the
will of the Board of Exruniners. Salaries for the professional staff of the State Department of Education
cannot be adopted without approval of the Board of
Examiners. Written contracts made in good faith between the State Board of Education and Directors of
state schools are capriciously nullified by the Board of
Examiners without investigation or explanation. The
Board of Education obtain approval for the salaries of
the directors of the institutions under its control and
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supervision. The situation has become so bad that the
Board of Education cannot now find competent personnel to fill vacancies as state directors of various departments of the public school system since it is known that
such an appointment might be disapproved by the Board
of Examiners. Under such circumst·ances the Board o:f
Education has submitted a request for an authorized
salary to be paid a state director of elementary education. Such salary being less than was paid to the former
director, and even this request is flippantly refused by
saying, ''To many employees now." The Board of FJducation could not even appoint the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction at a salary determined by such board.

POINT II
THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REDUCE APPROPRIATIONS MADE BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR
PUBLIC SCHOOL PURPOSES.

The argument of the Appellants to the above finding of the trial court appears to be Point V of the Appellant's brief. The trial court did not make a finding that
the budgetary control law was unconstitutional. The
issue stated by the Appellants and the argument made
ignores the real issue as stated above. The argument
is based upon broad generalities of constitutionality,
and innuendoes and inferences that the Board of Education is a spendthrift board operating under the conception that it must spend all money appropriated to it.
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The issue here discussed is not academic. The defendants
have in fact on different occasions openly ordered reductions in amounts appropriated by the Legislatur~
and have claimed nothing short of a continuing veto
power.
The statutory law pertaining to the relative authority of the parties hereto is as follows:
Section 53-3-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The State Board of Education shall be
charged with the administration of the system
of public instruction, and with general superintendence of the district schools of the State
and of the school revenue set apart and appropriated for their support."
By Section 53-3-7, U.C.A., 1953, the State Superintendent with the approval of the State Board of Education shall prepare and submit a proposed budget for submission by the Governor to the Legislature.
Section 53-3-8, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
"The State Auditor shall transfer to the state
general fund from the uniform school fund to the
credit of the State Board of Education the amount
designated by the Legislature for the operation
of the office of the State Superintendent and the
State Board of Education • • • ."
Section 6-±-1-16, U.C.A., 1953, provides that on the
first day of earh nwnth or as soon thereafter as the bills
for the expenses for the previous month have been audited, the governing board of each state institution shall
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make a requisition upon the State Auditor for a warrant
in sufficient amount to pay the bills so audited and
thereupon:
"the state auditor shall draw his warrant against
the appropriation made for such institution for
the amount named in the requisition in favor of
the treasurer of the governing board of the institution* * *."
Section 53-7-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides that it shall
be the duty of the state auditor to notify the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the actual amount of
money available in the uniform school fund. The State
Board of Education shall apportion and distribute said
fund among the several school districts, the Junior Colleges . . . Upon certification by the Superintendent of
Public Instruction as to the amount of apportionment
the State Auditor:
"shall forthwith draw his warrant on the State
Treasurer in favor of each of the respective school
districts and the institutions herein mentioned
for the amount to which each is entitled.... "
Section 63-2-20, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
"The Commission of Finance shall exercise
budgetary control over all state departments and
agencies. The Commission shall require the head
of each department to submit to it and to the
Governor not later than May 15 of each year, a
work program for the ensuing fiscal year and may
at any time require any department to submit a
work program for any other period * * *."
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The law then provides that the work program shall
state all appropriations and other funds available to the
particular department. It states that the aggregate of
the allotments shall not exceed the total appropriations
·or other funds available to the department for the fiscal
year requested. This section provides that the budget
officer under the direction of the governor shall revise,
alter, decrease, or change such allotments before approving the same.
It is the contention of the Defendants that they have
unlimited authority and power to revise, decrease or
alter proposed expenditures of funds by the State Board
of Education.
It is the contention of the State Board of Education
that the budgetary control specified in the foregoing
section only authorizes the Commission of Finance, the
budget officer, and the Governor to review the proposed
expenditures of funds to dete-rmine that expenditures do
not exceed appropriations and other available funds and
that the proposed expenditures are for public purposes
within the scope of the authority of the agency involved.
Article 7, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah specifies the procedure for the enactment of a
law requiring that bills passed by the Legislature must
be presented to the Governor for his approval. The
section specifies the veto power of the Governor and
further provides that once a bill has been approved by
the Governor or passed over the Governor's objection,
the same becomes law. In spite of this section of the
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Constitution the Governor claims to have a continuing
veto power over funds appropriated by the Legislature.
The State Board of Education, as provided in Title
53-33, U.C.A., 1953, has the direct responsibility of the
management, supervision and control of Weber College,'
Dixie Junior College and Carbon College. (Stipulation,
Counts 2 and 3, paragraph 7)
The thirtieth session of the Legislature of the State
of Utah passed .an appropriation bill by the terms of
which $1,163,280 were allocated to the Weber Junior College. (Session Laws 1953, Chapter 136, Item 88) The
amount of this appropriation was for a biennium and,
therefore, the amount available for a fiscal year was the
sum of $581,640. The amount appropriated became law
and was not vetoed by the Governor. However, on June
26, 1953, a letter to the Treasurer of We her College written by the budget officer at the direction of the Governor
provided as follows :
"Dear Dr. Foulger:
"Governor Lee has reviewed your 'Work
Program' for the first fiscal year of the 1953-55
biennium for the period beginning July 1, 1953
and ending June 30,1954.
"Under the provisions of Title 63-2-20, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the Governor deemed it
advisable to reduce the amount of the appropriation available from $581,640.00 to $502,612.09, a
net decrease of $79,027.91." (Exhibit 2, Page 9-a)
This was a clear attempt by the Governor to reduce
the amount appropriatea by the Legislature for Weber
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Junior College. To permit the reduction would be to hold
that the Governor has a continuing veto power. The
Legislature after having studied and investigated the
needs of the various institutions and having made appropriations therefor would be helpless to insure that
those appropriations would ultimately be made available
to the institution. Even if the Governor vetoed items
in the appropriations bill and subsequent thereto the
Legislature passed the act over the Governor's veto the
Governor, as claimed by the Defendants, would still have
the power and authority to subsequently reduce the
amount appropriated as attempted in the case of Weber
Junior College.
On June 8, 1952, Weber Junior College was advised
that a work program for the fiscal year beginning July 1,
1952, had been reviewed under the direction of Governor
Lee and that there w.as available for \Yeber Junior College during that fiscal year the sum of $695,950. (Exhibit
2, Page 1) On February 25, 1953, Weber Junior College
was advised that out of the work program approved for
the fiscal year there was available for use during the
month of April. 1953, the sun1 of $57,000. Pursuant to
this notification, \Veber Junior College specified the
"Object Classification" for which the sun1 of $57,000
should be issued. (Exhibit ~. Page 2) HoweYer, on
April 1, 1953, the Treasurer of \Y eber Junior College
received a cmnn1unication fro1n the budget officer in
part as follows:
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"Dear Dr. Foulger:
Pursuant to Title 63-2-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Governor J. Bracken Lee deemed
advisable to decrease your requested allotments
for operation and maintenance of your Administration Division for April, the first month of the
ensuing quarter, from $57,000.00 to $52,000.00, a
net decrease of $5,000.00" (Exhibit 2, Page 4)
If he could reduce the amount available by the sum
of $5,000.00, there is nothing to stop him from completely
eliminating the amount involved.
Weber Junior College protested the forced reduction
of $5,000.00. It was pointed out that the purchasing department had made purchases in reliance upon the funds
to be made available and that in order to secure discount
privileges bulk purchasing had been made for which
payments were due ,and owing. The Governor was further advised as follows:
"The reduced allotment release of $52,000 for
the month of April would not even meet our salaries." (Exhibit 2, Page 6)

Although it is intimated that the action of the Governor was to prevent the wasteful spending of unused
surpluses at the end of a fiscal period, this assertion is
refuted by the fact that the progr.am was approved on a
yearly basis and the table of actual expenditures shows
that the average expense during the months of December
through ~larch for the years 1951-1952 and 1952-1953
were $62,710 and $63,602, respectively. (Exhibit 2, Page
7)
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Similar reductions in the amount appropriated to
Carbon Junior College and Dixie Junior College were
required by the Governor on April 1, 1953, notwithstanding prior approval of the fiscal year work program.
(Exhibit 2, Pages 10, 14) Carbon Junior College had a
considerable amount of accounts payable for purchases
which required payment.
Dixie Junior College protested the order by a letter
to the budget examiner in part as follows :
"Actual monthly expenditures for contracted
salaries alone are more than the total amount
you propose for operation. In fact, the $9200.00
indicated in our request is $800.00 to $1000.00 less
than is required to meet current salary obligations. * * *" (Exhibit 2, Page 15)
By the laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 136, Item 85,
Carbon Junior College was appropriated by the Legislature the sum of $240,000 for the biennium. On J nne 26,
1953, the president of that college received notification
that the Governor was ordering a reduction for the fiscal
year from $120,000 to $107,635.84, a net decrease of $12,364.16. (Exhibit 2, Page 13-A) A similar reduction was
ordered by the Governor with reference to the funds
appropriated by the Legislature and permitted to become
law by the Governor for use by Dixie Junior College.
(Exhibit 2, Page 14)
In 1949 Governor Lee attempted to veto an item in
the appropriation bill .appropriating $20,000 to the State
Board of Education and referred to as a research fund.
Subsequent thereto a district court case was filed on the
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part of the Utah State Agricultural College challenging
the validity of a similar veto with reference to extension
service funds. The court held that such a veto was void.
The case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
Based upon the holding in that case a request was
made to the budget director of the State Finance Commission for the allocation for a fiscal year of $10,000
of the $20,000 fund. (Exhibit 2, Page 21) The Governor
still refused to make available any of these funds unless
the State Department of Education would agree to
certain terms demanded by the Governor. (Exhibit 2,
Pages 22-38)
Can the educational institutions properly function
and meet their responsibilities and liabilities if one man
has the absolute authority to veto at any time the funds
allocated to those institutions?
Article 5, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides :
"The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted."
It is fundamental that it is within the jurisdiction
of the Legislature to enact laws and appropriate funds
for the various state functions. The Governor is given
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some control over legislative enactments by virtue of the
power to veto proposed legislative enactments. However,
if the Governor fails to veto a bill or if a bill is passed
over the Governor's veto, the same becomes law and thereafter the Governor is bound by the terms of the law
and cannot thereafter alter the same.
It is fundamental that the Legislature may delegate
to administrative agencies the duty of determining when
a law shall take effect and that administrative agencies
may prescribe rules and regulations within the scope of
a gener.al standard prescribed by the Legislature.
It is equally fundamental that the Legislature may
not delegate to the executive branch of government the
power and authority to enact laws or to prescribe how
and when laws shall take effect solely 'vithin the discre.
tion of the executive agency. The arrogate who stops
payment of vouchers against appropriated funds bec-ause
of the power to appoint and hire and fire disbursing
officers destroys constitutional government. By dilatory
tactics, lulling into security, refusal to be bound by judicial opinion or decision, money appropriated is not forthcoming, promises are broken, confidence is lost, integrity
destroyed, .and the purposes and divisions of government
are frustrated.
The Utah cases have recognized the diYision of go\ernment in connection with the delegation of authority
by the Legislature.
In roung u. Salt Lake City (1902), 2-1 Ftah 321, 67
Pac. 1066, the Supreme Court was required to construe
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Article 5, Section 1, of the Constitution. The court cited
the well recognized rule as follows:
"It will be conceded that, while the Legislature c.annot delegate power to make laws, it may
still make laws to take effect upon the ascertainment of certain facts and conditions, and may
delegate the duty to determine the existence of
such facts to some other branch of the government."
In the case of State v. Gross, 79 Utah 559, 11 Pac.
2d 340, the court recognized the rule cited by the e.arlier
case and quoted with approval the following language
from a United States Supreme Court case:
"In creating such an administration agency,
the legislature to prevent its being a pure deleg.ation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a
certain course of procedure and certain rules of
decision in the performance of its function."
The court further stated :
"The Legislature may not delegate the power
to enact a law, or to declare what the law sh.all
be or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact a law complete in
itself designed to accomplish a general public
purpose, .and may expressly authorize designated
officials within definite valid limitations to provide rules and regulations for the complete opera.;
tion and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose."
A more recent discussion of the issue of the delegation of legislative authority is contained in Revre v.
Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 Pac. 2d 563. Th~
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Supreme Court affirms the fundamental propositions
concerning the delegation of legislative authority heretofore discussed.
The Department of Finance has no authority toestablish budgets for other state agencies or to dominate
the financial policies of any of the departments of government.
The State of Louisiana in 1942 established a Department of Finance which was directed to exercise budgetary control over the financial affairs of the various state
agencies. The law as cited in the case shows the close
similarity of the law of Louisiana with that of the State
of Utah.
In Wall v Close, 14 So. 2d 19, an act establishing
a financial code for the State of Louisiana to be administered by the Department of Finance was construed.
The law provided for a Director of Finance and a Budget
Officer who would aid the executive departments and the
Governor in preparing an executive budget to be presented to the Legislature for an appropriation. The constitutionality of the act was challenged and in affirming
the constitutionality of the act and reversing a lower
court's decision that the act was unconstitutional, two
judges dissenting, the Supre1ne Court stated as follows:
"Section 10 of Title 3 provides that after the
passage of the appropriation and revenue acts,
'the Budget Officer under the direction of the
Director of Finance shall cause to be prepared
a complete state budget for each year of the en84
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suing biennium.' This does not mean that the
Budget Officer, under the direction of the Director of Finance, is granted power and authority
to make up a financial budget for the state." (Emphasis added)
The court then goes on to state that it is just the duty
of the Budget Officer to compile a statement setting forth
in detail the financial plan for the executive budget as
modified and adopted by the Legislature. It is further
stated:
"Clearly, therefore, the functions of the Director of Finance and the officers serving in or
under that department are to assist the governor
and the legislature in gathering the data which
are to form the basis of the appropriations for
the different departments and agencies of the
state. In no way may these officers dictate or
dominate the financial policies of either the executive or the legislative department of the state.
The Department of Finance is in no sense, therefore, a department of the executive branch of the
government. It is no more so than would be an
expert accountant or auditor employed by the
executive department of the state to gather data
necessary to guide the department in formulating its financial plans." (Emphasis added)
The act further provided that no warrants could be
issued upon the State Treasury without first receiving
approval of the Director of Finance. Settling of claims
was also apparently granted to the Commission of Finance, but the holding of the Court is to the effect that
such activities were procedural only or ministerial and
were established for the purposes of accounting and were
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not intended to grant supervisory power to the Department of Finance.
The Governor does not have the authority in veto.
ing a bill to reduce the .amount of the appropriation, but
rather he can either approve or disapprove the entire
amount. It is therefore held that the Legislature cannot authorize the Governor to do indirectly what he is
prohibited by the Constitution from doing directly, namely, reduce the amount of an appropriation. And generally it is held that an attempted substitution of the
judgment of executive officers for that of the legislative
body constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions
which cannot be permitted under constitutional provisions establishing state representative government with
three coordinate departments.
Where the Legislature has attempted to specify the
terms under which a Governor would have authority to
reduce appropriations the court has held such delegation
to be unconstitutional.
In State ex rel Crable vs. Carter, 103 Pac. 2d 518,
( Oklahmna), an action was brought by members of the
State Department of Education and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction against the State Auditor
seeking a Writ of :Mandan1us to require the auditor to
draw warrants against the State Treasurer for payment
of claims of n1mnbers of the State Depnrhnent of Public
Instruction. It was alleged that the general departmental
appropriation bill allocated to the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction funds for traveling expenses and
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that there was an unexpended balance in said fund with
which to pay the claims. The state auditor refused to
approve the claims and so notified the Superintendent of
Public Instruction. The reasons assigned for rejecting
the claims were as follows:
"Claims listed here are rejected for the reason that they are in excess of the amount allocated
by the governor for the first three quarters of the
present fiscal year under the authorization of
House Bill No. 627 -17th Legislature and in excess
of the amount allocated to April 6, 1940."
Another claim was also included in the suit hy officers and employees of the State Board of Agriculture
and the auditor had refused these claims on the basis
that the governor had instructed the defendant not to
approve any such claims made against said appropriation. The statute giving the governor authority to approve quarterly budgets for state departments or institutions is set out in full in the report and is very similar
to the statutes of the State of Utah pertaining to budgetary control, however, this statute limits the governor's
authority to disapprove quarterly work programs only
if he believes that there will not be sufficient revenue to
meet the appropriations.
The Oklahoma court stated:
"Having determined that the appropriations
made in the departmental appropriation bill are
valid and binding and having the force and effect of law, the question arises whether or not the
Legislature may delegate to the Governor, under
certain conditions, the power to .annul or veto,
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in whole or in part, any item contained in such
appropriation bill. Petitioners urge that such
question was settled by this court in the case of
State ex rel Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okl. 32, 27
P. 2d 617, 624 91 A.L.R. 1497. In that case the
court was concerned with an appropriation to the
Corporation Commission .and a provision inserted
in the departmental appropriation bill providing
that said funds were 'to be expended by and with
the approval of the Governor.' Therein it was
said: ' * * * A provision requiring the approval
of the Governor of the expenditure of such an
appropriation is void for three reasons: First,
there is no .authority of law for the Governor to
approve an expenditure of money appropriated
for the purpose of enabling the Corporation Commission to perform the constitutional duty required to be performed by it under the provisions of
Section 29, Article 9, ·supra; second, the attempt
to authorize the Governor to exercise such power
is void under the provisions of Section 56, Article
5, supra; and, third, because the Legislature is
without authority to confer the power upon the
Governor to do indirectly a thing which the Governor could not be directly empowered to do, that
is, to reduce an item in .an appropriation bill. We
held to that effect in Peebly vs. Childres, State
Auditor, 95 Okl. 40, 217 P. 10-±9. See, also Regents
of State University vs. Trapp, Auditor, 28 Okl.
83, 113 P. 910, and Carter, State A.uditor vs. Rathburn, 85 Old. 251, 209 P. 9-±-±. • • • '
"(1-3) Since the power of the Governor to
veto items in an appropriation bill is liinited by
the Constitution any atte1npt on the part of the
Legislature to enlarge the exercise of that power
and to r hange the specified mode or 1nanner of its
exercise would contravene the constitutional pro88
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YlSIOn fixing the limit of such power. It
therefore appears that the statement made in
the case of State ex rei v. Carter, supra, that the
Legislature is without authority to empower the
Governor to reduce an item in the appropriation
bill is fundamentally correct and is controlling of
the question here presented.
"This conclusion, as we view it, is in harmony
with our fundamental concept of government relating to the division of powers. The responsibility of preventing the excessive expenditure of
such funds rests primarily upon the Legislature
who can refuse to appropriate such excess funds;
but if appropriated, the responsibility thereupon
shifts to the Governor who by the exercise of his
constitutionally granted veto power, at the time
and in the manner prescribed and limited by the
Constitution, can prevent such excessive expediture. However desirable it may be to prevent the
expenditure of funds in excess of available revenues, the courts must scrupulously maintain
the powers delegated to the legislative and executive branches of government, but at the same time
1nust as carefully maintain the constitutional restrictions imposed upon the exercise of those
powers, for herein lies the safeguard of representative government. liVe find nothing in our Constittttion which indicates that the framers thereof
contemplated that the Governor might be granted
a continuing veto power which, under any circumstances or conditions, might be exercised long
after the Legislature has adjourned. (Emphasis
added)
The court therefore held that a Writ of Mandamus
would properly lie against the auditor since the reasons
for denying the claims were that the Governor had not
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given his approval, the court having held that the Gover.
nor could not approve or disapprove claims upon appropriations made to the various departments.
The case of State v. Erickson, supra, construed a
section of the ~Iontana law which gave to the State
Board of Examiners broad power and authority
over the expenditures made by the educational institutions of the state. Part of that law is as follows:
Section 850, Revised Codes of 1921 :
"The state board of examiners * * * shall
have supervision and control of all expenditures
of all moneys, appropriated or received for the
use of said (educational) institutions from any
and all sources, other than that received under
and by virtue of the acts of Congress * * * shall
let all contracts * * * and shall audit all claims
to be paid from any moneys, * * * but * * * shall
have authority to confer upon the executive boards
of such institutions such power and authority in
contracting current expenses, and in auditing,
paying and reporting bills for salaries or other
expenses incurred in connection with such institutions, as may be deemed by said state board of
examiners to be to the best interest of said institution." (Emphasis added)
The court after citing the foregoing law and other
sections in connection therewith recognized that the
Board of Exan1iners had been granted by the Legislature
certain authority and discretion oYer expenditures of
funds appropriated by the Legislature. However, th~
court stated in this connection as follows:
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"While this board is given superv1swn and
control over the expenditures of moneys appropriated or received for the use of the educational
institution of the state, this power does not
mtthorize an arbitrary reduction by the board of
valid appropriations and authorized expenditures
from available funds applicable to such appropriations and expenditures which have been duly made
and authorized by the Legislative Assembly and
have received the approval of the Governor. Such
attempted substitution of the judgment of executive officers for that of the legislative body constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which
cannot be permitted under our constitutional division of state government into its three co-ordinate
departments; the authority to do so was denied
the governor in the exercise of his veto power in
Mills v. Porter, 222 P. 428, 69 Mont. 325, 35
A.L.R. 592, and there is much less reason for sustaining the exercise of such power by an executive board . When the Legislative Assembly has
expressed its solemn judgment as to the amount
necessary for the support and maintenance of an
institution for the fiscal year, and in doing so
has kept within the restrictions imposed by the
Constitution both as to such general appropriation and its appropriations generally for such
year, the executive and judicial departments of
the state must bow to that judgment." (Emphasis
added)
These cases point out why the Legislature could not
if it so intended delegate to the executive branch of the
government the power and authority to reduce appropriations contained in a bill which has become law.
It is submitted that it was not the intention of the
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Legislature to so provide when they enacted the law
establishing budgetary control Consider for instance the
emergency legislation during the depression. Section
90-0-2, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, as amended by
Chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1933, provided for budgetary
control in substantially the same manner as the present
law. More particularly the law stated that if the Governor deems necessary he may "revise, alter, decrease or
change such allotments." In spite of this law the Legis~
lature in 1933 enacted Chapter 72 of the Laws of Utah
1933, entitled "Emergency Power of Governor Over
State Revenue." (Stipulation, Counts 2 and 3, paragraph
15) By the terms of this law the Governor was authorized to require periodic reports of proposed expenditures
of each department and to compel reductions in expenditures. The law likewise gave broad authority over employment and suspension of personnel and suspension or
ternporary elimination of certain agencie-s and functions
of the government. However, this authority was only
granted with certain restrictions and any reductions of
expenditures or suspension of services were only permitted for a temporary period. Had the Legislature felt
that under the budgetary control law the Governor had
the necessary authority to reduce appropriations, etc.,
it would have been unnecessary to enact these emergency
powers. The law giving the Governor this authority has
been repealed by the Legislature. (Session Laws of Utah
1947, Chapter 136.)
Closer exa1nination of the budgetary .control law
likewise shows that the Legislature did not intend that
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the Governor, the Department of Finance or the budget
officer should have unlimited authority to revise, alter,
decrease or change the allotments. The act, after providing that the various departments submit to the Department of Finance their respective work programs and
specifying that the budget officer under the direction of
the Governor could revise, alter or decrease the allotments, then states:

" * • * The aggregate of such allotments shall
not exceed that total appropriations or other funds
from any source whatsoever made available to
said department for the fiscal year in question."
... (63-2-20 UCA 1953)
The foregoing definitely establishes a rule or guide
to be followed by the Governor and the budget officer
in reviewing the work programs. The law then provides
that the approved work program shall be transmitted to
the department in question and to the state auditor and
then states :

" • * * The Commission of Finance shall thereupon permit all expenditures to be made from the
appropriations or other funds from any source
whatsoever on the basis of such allotments and
not otherwise * * *" (63-2-20 UCA, 1953)
The Defendants' main argument in answer to the
proposition advanced by the Intervenor is based on insinuation and inferences that the Board of Education
constitutes a bureaucratic agency insulated from the
electorate and indifferent to public opinion concerned
primarily with wasteful and extravagant spending.
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Starting with this assumption, the Defendants then argue
the policy reasons for the establishment of a financial
code. The Intervenor has no quarrel with the proposition that it is a good business practice for a depart.
ment to estimate its financial needs and to allocate the
expenditure of its funds based upon a fiscal work program which takes into consideration all of the funds
which are available to the department However, such
an argument evades the issue here presented as to the
authority of the Governor and budget officer to reduce
appropriations made by the Legislature to another department of government.
Only two cases are cited by the Defendants in answer
to the respondents on this issue. The first case is Che.~
vs. Utah State Build,ing Commission, 93 utah 538, 74
Pac. 687. This case involved a supposed ambiguity in
the statute appropriating money for state building. The
appropriation, contingent upon many happenings, was
made to the Governor. \Vhether there were to be any
funds and the allocation of those funds depended on
many contingencies....<\s was stated at Page 553 of the
Utah Report, the money was to come from emergency
relief funds commencing at a future date. Secondly,
from the 1noney received $3,200,000 had to be first allocated for welfare purposes. Thirdly, any expenditures
for Carbon College were dependent upon the taxing units
providing a suitable can1pus, and fourthly, a site was
to be procured by the state for a tuberculosis sanitarium.
r_rhe decision as to how th0 lUOney lnight be spent would
be further influenced by the availability of federal funds
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to be used in addition to the state funds. In view of this
factual situation, the legislature felt that it was required
to leave to the discretion of the Governor the actual allocation of the funds once they became available. The
Governor, in fact, had allocated the funds.
The issue therefore is substantially different from
the one here presented. In the present case the appropriation is not to the Governor, but rather to a constitutional
agency. In the present case the Governor has not approved the appropriations, but rather has attempted to
decrease specific appropriations made by the Legislature. Third, the issue as stated by the court above gives
no support for a consideration of when and under what
conditions authority may be delegated to the Governor
over financial matters. The Defendants quote a part of
a short statement by the court which would tend to lead
one to believe that the court was deciding that the Legislature had unlimited authority with reference to the subject of appropriations. However, the entire quotation
concerning this subject is as follows:
"No attack has been made on the p.articular
method of appropriations; that is where the whole
sum is appropriated to the Governor and he is
vested with discretion to reduce, transfer, or eliminate items or parts thereof. It is sufficient to
say that in the absence of constitutional provision
to the contr.ary the power of the Legislature on
the subject of appropriations is plenary."
The court by its very statement indicates that there
was no real issue raised by the pleadings and arguments
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in this case on the issue of granting authority to the
Governor and contented itself to make a general o·bservation in this regard. The observation so made stated that
"in the absence of a constitutional provision to the contrary." It is submitted that in this case there are constitutional provisions to the contrary. The section of the
constitution dividing the state government into three specific branches and the section of the constitution defining
the veto power of the Governor are contrary to the supposed authority granted in the Finance Commission law.
The only other case cited by the Defendants on this
point is State ex rel Boyle vs. Ernst, 195 Wash. 214, 78
Pac. 2d 526. This was a suit in mandamus to compel
payment of welfare funds. The law appropriating the
funds stated that the expenditure could not be made except upon allotments approved by the Governor. In this
case the petitioner alleged that the Governor had not
approved the allotments. This case does not raise the
issue presented before the court. It does not involve an
attempt by a Governor to reduce amount of appropriations made by a Legislature. Rather, it involves the disbursetnent of funds appropriated to a statutory administrative agency and involves the n1ethods of expenditures. The precise issue in the
ashington case was
whether a writ of mandmnus would be issued to compel
expenditure of welfare funds without the Governor's approv.al. That issue, as has been stated, is substantially
different from a situation where the Governor is attmnpting to reduce a specific appropriation made to a

'V
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separate department, not involving statutory administrative agencies.
Defendants have .argued that the terms "revise, alter,
decrease or change" can have no meaning if they are
qualified by the further statement that the allotments
cannot exceed "the total appropriation or other funds
from any source whatever made available to the department for the fiscal year in question." Such is not
the case. A department may desire to revise, alter, decrease or change specific allocations contained in the
work program by transferring funds from one proposed
expenditure to another type of expenditure, or for expending a larger part of its appropriations during one
fiscal year than during another period of the biennium.
If the budgetary control law of the State of Utah
is to be held constitutional, it must be limited to conferring only ministerial duties upon the Department of
Finance and not as conferring the right to reduce appropriations made by the Legislature. The law as con
tained in the Utah, Oklahoma and Montana cases .as
reviewed above will not support a statutory construction
amounting to a holding that .an unlimited, continuing veto
power has been delegated to the Defendants. The Utah
Legislature obviously did not intend such a delegation.
The budgetary control law still serves a useful and
needed purpose and gives full faith to the legislative
intent by holding th.at the authority therein conferred
is limited to the ministeral function of aiding in budget
planning and the pre-auditing of expenditures to deter-
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nune that they are within appropriations and are for
public purposes.

POINT III
IF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR FINANCE COMMISSION HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE APPROPRIATED FUNDS OF THE BOARD OF EDU0ATION, IT IS
MINISTERIAL.

"\Ve have heretofore presented the argument that
the Board of Examiners does not have authority to disapprove disbursement of funds by the State Board of
Education for public school purposes. For the purposes
of this point, if there be some control over disbursements
of the Board of Education, the power or authority given
the Board of Examiners or the Finance Commission
is li1nited to the performance of ministerial acts. Such
authority must not violate the power of the Board of
Education under the constitutional provision creating
it.
The Board of Education admits that it must follow
proper accounting and auditing procedures to safeguard
the expenditure and disbursement of public. funds entrusted to it. However, to have the power to supervise
and control the public. sehool system it 1nust have author"
ity and discretion to determine how the money shall be
spent for public. school purposes.
It should be noted that the constitutional section
established the Board of Examiners and defining its
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powers is divided into two sections. The first states that
they shall have power "to examine all claims against
the state * * * and perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by law; and no claim against the state, * * *
shall be passed upon by the legislature without having
been considered and acted upon by the s1aid Board o~
Examiners." It will be noted as to the first type of clain1s
which do not require presentation to the legisla,ture, it
states .the Board of Examiners shall have power to examine only, but as to the second type of claim, which
must he presented to the legislature, it states they shall
he considered and acted upon by the said Board of
Examiners. It would, therefore, appear that as to disbursements by the Board of Education - assuming such
claims must be presented to the Board of Examiners -the Board of Examiners would only have power to examine, which construction is consistent with the Nevada
cases heretofore discussed.
The Commission of Finance, created in 1941, has
authority to pre-audit disbursement of funds. Prior to
this time the Board of Examiners by statute had been
performing auditing and accounting functions. The Intervenors admit that the transfer of these duties could
be properly made to the Department of Finance. But
whether or not the Department of Finance is acting in
the capacity of an agent of the Board of Examiners as
contended by defendants, its authority is limited to a
determination of whether or not expenditures are for
public purposes and are within an appropriation made
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by the Legislature. This is true whether the auditing
agency is created either by constitution or by statute.
In the ~iassachusetts case of W illar v. Common.
wealth, 9 NE 2nd 405, 297 Mass. 527, the Court held that
the Governor and the fiscal agency given control over financial matters of the state had the duty to insure that
payments out of the public treasury were not made except for public purposes and in accordance with the law.
This was an action involving a dispute as to the authority
of the Department of Public Works in relation to the
authority of the Governor and the council which was
given authority over financial matters of the state. Concerning this dispute the court stated:
"* * *It was not the purpose to give the Governor and Council power to veto contracts or
purchases lawfully made by authorized officers
or to refuse to honor debts and obligations lawfully incurred."
In the Ohio case of State v. Defen-bacher, 91 NB
2nd 512, 153 Ohio St. 268, the Court stated:
"In the event there is money in a state fund;
available for the purpose for which it is sought, it
is the ministerial duty of the Director of Finance,
upon proper submission of an incumbrance estimate or certificate for the purpose of incumbering
such 1noney for such purpose, to make the certification required by Section 2288-2 General Code.
The discharge of this duty may be compelled by
mandamus."
(See also State v. Ferguson, 50 NE 2nd 992, 142
Ohio St. 179)
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In the Indiana case of State v. Clamme, 134 NE 676,
80 Ind. A pp. 147, the court held the Legislature could not
create a department with power to supervise and control
public officers in the performance of their duties. In
this case the court stated as follows:
" (8) The department of inspection and supervision of public offices was created for the
purpose of examining the accounts of such public
officers as handle public funds. From the Legislation relating to that department, it clearly appears that its powers and duties are limited to the
subject of accounting and reporting. * * *
"There is absolutely nothing in any of the
legislation relating to this subject which tends in
the slightest degree to authorize the department
to control the discretion of any public officer,
administrative board, or other governmental
agency whatsoever. Indeed, the Legislature could
not create a department and endow it with power
to supervise and control public officers in the
performance of their duties generally, without
amending all the laws relating to the powers and
duties of the officers of the state and of every
administrative subdivision of the state. It is to
be presumed that if the Legislature were to attempt such a comprehensive and serious project,
it would not be unmindful of constitutional provision, State Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 19.21."
In the Florida case of State ex rel W. R. Clark
Printing & Binding Co., Inc., et al v. Lee, State Comptroller, 163 So. 702, 121 Fla. 320, the court in construing
a constitutional provision said :
"Section 25 of Article 4 of the State Constitution, vesting the comptroller with power to ex101
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amine, audit, adjust and settle accounts of State
Officers, confers upon the comptroller the right,
and imposes upon him the duty to see to it that
all disbursements of public moneys are authorized
by a legal appropriation, that the payment of a
particular item violates no positive prohibition
against payment, expressly or impliedly forbidden
by law. That section and articles vest t·he comptroller with no supervisory authority to veto or
disallow items of expenditure for which a lawful
appropriation had been made by the Legislature
and the payment of which, as approved by the
responsible officer or agency incurring the obligation under statutory power so to do, violates no
provision of law."
(See also State v. Gay, 46 So. 2nd 711, Florida 1950.)
In the Illinois case of People ex rel State Board of
Agriculture v. Brady, 115 NE 204, 277 Ill. 124, the court
construed another constitutional provision by saying:
"The Constitution created the office of the
Auditor of Public Accounts, on whose warrant
alone money was to be drawn from the Treasury.
He was made the official examiner of accounts
and claims against the state, which must be verified by him. The duty to determine whether a
particular claim constitutes an obligation against
the state is implied by the title of his office, and
it is only when he draws his warrant for what he
finds to be a proper charge against the state that
it can be paid by the Treasurer. It is not within
the power of the General Assembly to deprive
the Auditor of Public Accounts of the power conferred upon him by the Constitution to audit
claims and charges against the state created in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. If a
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sum of money, or so much t-h.ereof as may be necessary for a specific purpose, is appropriated by
law and paid over to any officer, board, or other
attthority authorized to make the expenditures,
then the board, officer or authority becomes the
one to determine the proper obligations of the
state instead of the Auditor of Public Accounts,
while the Constitution contemplates that, the expenditure having been made or the obligation incurred, an account shall be submitted to the auditor for his examination and verification before
any money is drawn from the state treasury."
(Emphasis added)

In the Arizona case of Proctor v. Hunt, 29 Pac. 2nd
1058 (Arizona 1934) the court stated that an auditor
had no discretion in the issuance of warrants if the
voucher showed that the funds were for public purposes
and were drawn against duly made appropriations. The
law in Arizona as to the duties of auditor states as
follows:
"The auditor shall: (1) Audit, adjust and
settle the amount of claims against the state
payable out of funds of the state. • • .,
The court in following the prior decisions of the
court stated:
"In the present case, the v.arious claims were
approved by the Governor of Arizona, the head of
the department for which the appropriations,
which it is contended justified the expenditure
of the money in question, were made. We think
under these circumstances that unless it appeared
upon their face, that the claims, as approved by
the Governor, were not in proper form or not for
a public purpose, connected with the activities
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of the Governor's office, for which an appropriation had been made, it was the duty of the auditor, enforceable by mandamus, to issue a warrant
therefor."
The s.ame result was reached in Ward v. Frohmiller,
100 Pac. 2nd 167, 55 Ariz. 202, on a claim for out of state
travel. See also Fairfield v. W. J. Corbett Hardware
Co., 215 Pac. 510, 25 Ariz. 199.
In the ~fissouri case of State v. Hackmann, (Mo.
1919) 217 SW 271, a State Auditor had refused to issue
a w.arrant for the payment of the salary of an employee
of the State Board of Equalization for which an appropriation had been made. Concerning the auditor's refusal, the court stated:
"It is plain, therefore, that under the law
and the facts in this c.ase, it is the duty of respondent to audit and allow relator's claim and to issue
to him a warrant upon the State Treasury for the
full amount thereof. Respondent has no discretion in the matter. It is a plain ministerial duty."
The cases reviewed by the Defendants are not factually in point and do not determine the issue here presented.
The case of Reeves v. Talbot, 289 I\::y. 581, 159 SW
2d 51, involving a request for out-of-state travel, discusses the relative authority of the Department of Finance .and the Com1nissioner of Revenue. Cases involving travel pay should be distinguised from disbursement
of other appropriations. The situation here is similar
to disbursement of funds to the state board members,di104
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rectly for their own expenses. The statutes specifically
require that for travel expenses for members of the Board
of Education, the Board of Exa1niners must approve the
same. However, for other disburse1nents there is no such
requirement. The directors of the junior colleges and
the other colleges under the jurisdiction and control of
the Board of Education enter into contracts authorizing
disbursement of funds, etc., which action is independently
ehecked and reviewed by the State Board of Education.
However, for personal expenses or travel pay of the
board members, there is no independent check unless,
as the Legislature has provided, the Board of Examiners
or some other agency is required to review those disbursements.
The holding in Reeves v. Talbot, supra, is similar
to the holding in Marioneaux v. Cutler, supra, and State
v. Edwards, supra, in that the court held in the Talbot
case that the Department of Finance's refusal was-

"* * * based upon a misconstruction of the
applicable law. The effect was to deprive the
Commissioner of Revenue of a right which on a
correct construction of the law would have been
recognized."
Therefore, the court's discussion as to the discretionary
authority of the Department of Finance is only dicta.
However, such discussion merely states that the Department of Finance should approve"• • • the requisition if the purpose is within
the scope of the appropriation for the department
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and the amount is within the unexpended balance
to the credit of the particular fund."
At another place the court stated that the commissioner could refuse the request if in his opinion-

"* * * the proposed travel is not legitimate
or proper, considering the functions of the department and the nature of the duties of the officer
or employee and, as well, the purpose and character of the business to be attended to, or if he
regards the proposed expenditure as prima facie
excessive or if he ascertains it will exceed the
balance of funds alloted to the department, he
should disapprove the requisition in the manner
prescribed by the statute."
It is submitted that the court establishes the rule
that the Department of Finance has the duty to examine
the request to determine if there are sufficient funds
appropriated to the department involved, that the request
is for a public purpose within the scope of the authority
of the particular department, and that the request does
not violate any provision of the law. Such a holding
is consistent with the contention of the Intervenor.
The Kentucky court further stated that the request
should be considered as "prima facie valid and proper."
However, in the present case, the Defendants take the
position that they have unlimited authority to approve
or disapprove any request by the Respondent, which action can only be challenged by showing an abuse of discretion on the part of the Defendants. The Kentucky
case did not require the plaintiffs to show an abuse of
discretion on the part of the Defendants. Rather, the
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Department of Finance would have to show an abuse
of discretion before it could deny the request.
On May 18, 1953, the State Board of Education requested approval from the State Board of Examiners
for the State Superintendent to attend the annual meetings of the National Council of Chief State School Officers and the National Education Association. The Board
of Examiners were advised as follows:
"Superintendent Bateman is Vice-President
of the National Council of Chief State School Officers. He is chairman this year of the nominating
committee, has been assigned to preside at one
of the general meetings, and is to be .a speaker at
another general meeting."
The Board of Examiners were further advised that
the expenses would be paid from the Public School Administration Fund. On May 29, 1953, the Board of Examiners, by a letter, stated:
"The board denied your request to incur outof-state travel expense for yourself to Miami
Beach, Florida, June 24 to July 1."
The case of Reeves v. Talbot cited by the Defendants
would require the Board of Examiners to approve such
a request for out-of-state travel.
The case of State ex rel Yapp v. Chase, infra, cited
by the Defendants deals with authority over employment
of personnel and will be discussed under Point IV dealing specifically with that problem. However, the case is
of interest since it held that the Commission of Adminis107
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tration and Finance did not, in that c.ase, have any dis~
cretionary power. The court stated:
"The conclusion follows that the existing law
gave these employees a legal right to receive as
compensation for their servicesthe amount &peci~
fied in the estimate, and there was no valid reason
for refusing to approve such estimate. Its ap~
proval under such circumstances did not involve
the exercise of any discretionary power." (Em~
phasis added)
The Defendants rely on the case of State v. Manning,
220 Iowa 525, 259 NW 213. It is asserted that the Court
in that case sustained the discretionary power of a budget
officer. The case was brought to remove a mayor and
two city commissioners for transferring municipal funds
from one account to another in violation of the specific
provisions of the state law. The Defendants as a de~
fense challenge the constitutionality of the law. There
is no showing that the budget officer was requested
to approve the transfer or that any action of any type
was taken by the budget officer.
The decision of the Iowa court is of no value in de·
termining whether the Board of Examiners or Commission of Finance in this case has either discretionary or
ministerial authority.
The defendants cite Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz.
239, 24 Pac. 2d 666 as a case similar to Reeves v. Talbot,
supra, pertaining to a "provision of an appropriations
act requiring the Governor's approval as to legality and
necessity for proposed travel expenses." This case, like
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those heretofore reviewed and cited by the Defendants,
is of no help in deciding the issue now presented to this
court. In the first instance the claim was not proposed
travel expenses, but rather was a claim for one day's
salary. Secondly, the issue raised before the court was
the constitutionality of an appropriations act. The court
held that the act was unconstitutional since it involved
not only appropriations, but also legislation regarding
the disbursement of funds.
If the case stood for the proposition as asserted
by the Defendants, the holding would be inconsistent
with the subsequent .Arizona case of Ward v. Frohmiller,
supra. This was an action by employees against the state
auditor to approve travel expenses for attending conferences concerning governmental problems. The case
is a clear holding that authority of a state officer to adjust and settle the amount of claims against the state
payable out of the funds of the state is limited to the
ministerial function of determining if the funds are being
disbursed for a public purpose and within an appropriation made by the Legislature. The court in so holding
stated as follows:
".After this is done, it must be presented to
the auditor, and if it is, on its face, for a public
purpose and is properly itemized and accompanied
by vouchers, and an appropriation has been made
by law for that purpose, it is the mandatory duty
of the auditor to approve said claim and to issue
a warrant therefor; no discretion being given, if
the matters recited beforehand appear in the
claim as presented."
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The court summarized its holding as follows :
"We hold, therefore, that if it appears from
the face of the claims in the present case that they
were in proper form and that the money claimed
thereunder was expended for a public purpose,
and they were properly approved by the head of
th~ state department, it was the duty of the auditor to approve the claims and issue the warrants.''
Another Arizona case, Industrial Commission v.
Price, 37 Ariz. 245, 292 Pac. 1099, is cited by the Defendants. The case does not involve disbursement of
funds or budgetary control, but rather deals with the
authority of a statutory administrative agency to enter
into employment contracts. This case will be reviewed
under the next point specifically considering that issue.
The Defendants cite the case of Wycoff v. W. H.
Wheeler & Co., 38 Okla. 771, 135 Pac. 399, in answer to
the Intervenor's assertion that the Board of Examiners
and Commission of Finance have only ministerial duties
with reference to disbursement of funds appropriated
by the Legislature. This case once again is not factually
in point. The case involved a suit by a publishing company to enjoin the defendants from entering into a new
contract for the supplying of text books to the schools
in the State of Oklahoma. The court stated that the
issue was whether the Plaintiff had a valid contract to
supply the text books. The law specifically provided that
the Board of Education as the text-book commission could
investigate and advertise for bids with reference to the
books to be used, and that in entering into a contract the
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publishing company had to present a written contract
and bond for performance. The law provided that the
bond should be approved by the Governor. The Governor
refused to approve the bond. The court stated:
"From all of which it appears that the state
entrusted the business of making this contract to
two of its agents, who were required to work together to that end-the Board and the Governor,
and prescribed the duties of each; * * * The functions each had to perform were intended to be
of equal importance and indispensable to the
other."
Since the Governor had not approved the bond, the court
held that the Plaintiff did not have a valid contract.
It is not sufficient to answer the cases cited by the
Intervenor by merely stating that they involved auditors
and comptrollers. In those cases often the constitutional
authority was much broader than the mere authority of
''examining" claims as granted to the Board of Examiners.

In State ex rel W. R. Clark Printing & Binding Company, Inc., et al v. Lee, State Comptroller, supra, the
court was construing the authority contained in Sec. 25,
Article IV, Florida Constitution, which stated that the
comptroller had power to examine, audit, adjust and settle accounts of state officers." In fact, the most that
can be said about the Board of Examiners is that as to
the Board of Education it is a board of auditors.
As was

st~ated

in Lewis v. Doran, supra:
111
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"The relator, forever, contends that the word
'examiner' means auditors; and that the powers
instant to the name, being specifically conferred,
are taken from the comptroller. Admit the proposition as to the meaning of the word, yet the conclusion does not follow for the Board of Examiners might be auditors, and still the comptroller
be, as the name implies, chief auditor."
As to the Board of Examiners, the Defendants rely,
of course, primarily on the Idaho cases. As previously
discussed, the Idaho cases are to be distinguished since
the implementing legislation in Idaho considerably broadened the authority of the Board of Examiners. Also, the
Supreme Court sits as an appellate court of claims to
review the action of the Board of Examiners for recommendation to the Legislature. Also, there have been two
amendments to the constitutional provision involved
in the State of Idaho. In view of the constitutional, legislative and case history, the Idaho cases must be distinguished.
The Utah cases cited by Defendants concerning the
authority of the Board of Examiners stand only for the
proposition that if refusal to approve a claim is based on
an issue of law the Board will be ordered to act or refrain from acting, depending on the determination of the
legal question. The cases do not adjudicate the nature of
the Board's authority.
Only three Utah cases have involved the Board of
Examiners as a party to the litigation. These cases considered the duty of the Board of Examiners in examining
112
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claims which, as recognized by the Defendants, involved
only questions of law. In Thoreson v. State Board of
Examiners, supra, our Utah court stated:
"It became and was a mandatory duty of the
said board to receive, audit, and allow said claim,
and that mandamus lies to enforce the performance of that ministerial duty."
In State v. Cutler, supra, the court stated:
"There is nothing upon which the Respondents can legally exercise any discretionary powers
in this case, and therefore, they should have audited and allowed the claim."
The third cHse of Marioneaux v. Cutler, supra,
did not discuss discretionary power, but rather
considered the legality of the payment as raised
by the decision of the Board of Examiners. None of
these cases stands for a holding that the Board of Ex.
aminers does have discretionary authority in a case such
as is presented to the court.
It is, of course, conceded that when the Board of
Examiners is sitting as a court of claims for miscellaneous demands made upon the state and for the sifting
of information and referring the same to the Legislature,
that in such a case they would have discretionary authority. But it is here maintained that a disbursement
by the Board of Education is not a claim within the
jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners, but if it is concluded to be such a claim the authority of the Board of
Examiners would be to determine if the disbursement is
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authorized by an appropriation and is otherwise not illegal.
In Utah the Department of Finance was created to
pre-audit disbursements and the auditor, a constitutional
officer, is required to post-audit disbursements. It cannot be maintained that a statutory agency with preauditing functions should have greater authority than
the auditor.
In State Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe,
56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59, the court stated:
"However, it is no concern of the auditor,
neither is it a part of his duty to ascertain whether
the investment is desirable or whether the security is sufficient. Whenever the Land Board, or
any committee or official whose duty it is to determine those matters, has acted, such acts or conclusions are final and binding upon the auditor,
so long as the investment is authorized by law.
:ill •
*
"In the very nature of things in carrying on
the affairs of the state, it could not be otherwise.
If the auditor were charged with the duty and
responsibility of examining and determining the
legality and desirability of the investment of the
funds of the state, then, indeed, would conflicts,
disputes, and general chaos follow. The law has
vested no such duty or authority in the auditor."
If the authority of the Board of Examiners as a
board of auditors over specific appropriations and the
Department of Finance as a pre-auditing agency are not
limited to the san1e 1ninisterial function as the auditor, as
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was stated in the Ririe case, "conflicts, disputes and general chaos" will follow, as is shown by the facts of this
case.
In the recent case of State Board of Education, et al
v. Commission of Finance, supra, the Commission of
Finance did not assert that it had discretionary
authority. In refusing to approve the payment of salaries
established by the State Board of Education, the Commission of Finance contended that the State Board of
Education was not legally constituted. They contended
it did not have .authority to appoint the state superintendent and fix his salary. The pleadings and the briefs
set forth the statutes establishing the Department of
Finance and its authority to approve disbursement of
funds. No argument was made by the Department of
Finance claiming a discretion to allow or disallow a claim.
We must therefore conclude:
1. The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions where agencies are set up by the Constitution or by
statute for the protecting of the funds of the State regard the action of such agencies as ministerial and
without discretion.
2. The Utah law as decided particularly by the case
of State v. Cutler, supra, is a direct holding that the
Board of Examiners have no discretionary powers where
a claim is specifically payable out of a defined appropriation. The most that Defendants can argue is that so far
as the Board of Education is concerned the Board of
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Examiners have a ministerial responsibility to examine
the claims.
3. The Utah law as decided in the case of State
Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, supra, holds that
the Auditor, a constitutional officer, has only a ministerial duty over the expenditures of other .agencies. The
Department of Finance, a statutory auditing agency, can
have no greater authority.
4. The cases cited by the Defendants do not consider the issues as here presented, and are not factually
in point. Certainly the Commission of Finance has only
a ministerial duty with reference to disbursements by
the State Board of Education.
5. If disbursements by the Respondents are considered to be claims which must be presented to the Board
of Examiners, the authority of the Board should be
limited to "Examination" of those disbursements within
the limitations herein discussed.

POINT IV
IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

We have heretofore discussed the factual situation
concerning the employment of personnel by the State
Board of Education and control and supervision exercised by the Department of Finance and the Board of
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Examiners. (Point I) The discussion of the law under
that point was limited to the determination of whether
the Board of Examiners had any authority over such
matters. The issue here presented relates to the apparent conflict in statutory authority of the Board of
Education and the Department of Finance.
The trial court found: "The Board of Examiners and
the Finance Commission do not have authority over the
employment of experts or specially qualified personnel
by the Board of Education." (R. 73) The Appellant in
challenging the determination by the trial court merely
cites the statute and states that it speaks for itself.
Reference is then made to cases considered under a preceding point. Such an approach to the problem ignores
specific statutory authority granted to the Board of Education. It also ignores the legislative history and the
nature of the enactments. The authority of the Board
of Education is subsequent to the authority of the Commission of Finance. The authority of the Board of Education is specific, while the authority of the Commission
of Finance is general. The two cases dealing with the
specific problem of the employment of personnel discussed in the preceding point referred to by the Defendants do not stand for the proposition for which they are
cited and can be readily distinguished.
The Board of Education, in addition to having the
constitutional and statutory authority of general supervision and control of the public school system, is authorized by Section 53-2-8, U.C.A., 1953, as follows:
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"The Board may appoint such .assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants,
clerical workers, and other employees, as in the
judgment of the Board may be necessary to the
proper administration and supervision of the
public school system. The salaries of such assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers, and other employees shall
be fixed by the Board and shall be paid from
money appropriated for that purpose."
The law as it above reads was enacted by Chapter
16, Section 3, Laws of Utah 1951, Fiist Special Session.
Section 5 of the foregoing Chapter 16, Laws of Utah
1951, First Special Session, provided :
"All existing statutes of the State of Utah
which are inconsistent or in conflict with this act,
are to the extent of such inconsistency or conflict, declared null and void insofar as they relate
to the provisions of this act."
Section 53-2-8 was amended by Chapter 80, Section
1 ,Laws of Utah 1953; however, the above provisions were
not changed.
The foregoing statutory provisions clearly specify
that the Board of Education shall have authority to em-·
ploy its personnel and to determine the salary which shall
be paid to them. However, the Departn1ent of Finance
maintains that it has authority over such matters by
virtue of Sections 63-2-13 and 63-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, for1nerly Sections 82C-2-13 and 82C-2-14,
which provide as follows:
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63-2-13. "The commissiOn of finance shall
prescribe and fix a schedule of salaries for the
officers, clerks, stenographers and employees of
state offices, departments, boards and commissions, except where such s.alaries are fixed by
statute or by appropriation; and such schedule of
salaries shall have the force of law in all state
offices, departments, boards and commissions, and
shall in no case be exceeded without the express
approval of the commission of finance.
63-2-14. "The commission of finance shall examine all requests for personnel and shall approve
or disapprove the same and no new position shall
be created and no vacancy shall be filled until
the commission has certified to the department
requesting the creation of a new position or the
filling of the vacancy that the position is necessary to carry on the work of such department in
an efficient and business-like manner and that the
necessary funds therefor are available to the department. The commission shall investigate the
need for every existing position in every department and shall report its findings to the board of
examiners with its recommendations for the most
effective me.ans of discontinuing unnecessary
positions."
The foregoing sections were enacted in 1941 and have not
been amended since that time. The specific authority of
the Board of Education is granted subsequent to the
general authority of the Commission of Finance.
The following brief quotations accurately state a
fundamental rule of construction which has been ignored
by the Defendants :

March v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 119, 282 Pac. 1055:
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"It is a familiar and elementary rule of
statutory construction that if it is not possible to
reconcile inconsistent statutes, the dates of their
enactment will be consulted in determining the
legislative meaning and effect given to the later
one. See United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 92, 20 L. Ed. 153 ; Sedgwick on Statutory
Construction, 125; State ex rel. Attorney General
v. Heidorn, 74 Mo. 410; Bramham v. City of Durham, 171 N.C. 196, 88 SE 347; in re Ogilvie's Estate, 291 Pa. 326, 139 A. 826; State v. Anderson,
191 Wis. 538, 211 NW 938."

State v. Langer, 177 NW 408, 46 N.D. 462:
"It is a well-settled rule of law, where two
legislative acts are reJ!ugnant to or in conflict with
each other, that the latest expression of the legislative will must control, even though it contains
no repealing clause. 36 Cyc.1073."
The Legislature could not, even if it so intended,
constitutionally grant to the Department of Finance
power and authority by virtue of controlling the employment of personnel the right to interfere with the
functions of the State Board of Education. However,
in this case the Legislature has not so intended, rather
it has by statute granted to the Board of Education complete control and supervision over the employment of its
personnel. By the terms of the law amending and reenacting these provisions, all prior laws inconsistent
or in conflict therewith were declared null and void insofar as they related to the authority of the Board of
Education. The statutory authority of the Commission
of Finance as construed by the Defendants would there120
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fore be null and void. In addition, the specific authority
of the Board of Education would control over the general authority of the Department of Finance.
The courts construing similar authority have uniformly held that it was the intention of the Legislature
to grant complete control over employment to the agency
involved.
In State v. Miser, 72 Pac. 2nd 408, 30 Ariz. 244, the
court held that such a statute, conferring authority
over employment of personnel upon the Board of Regents of the University of Arizona, gave to that Board
complete control in the management of its affairs placing wholly within its hands the power to say who shall
enter the service of the University, from president to
janitor, and to decide what salary shall be paid. The Arizona law stated:
"Sec. 1135. Powers of board; appointment
of professors; salaries; tuition. The board shall
enact ordinances for the government of the university; appoint and employ a president of the
university, and professors, instructors, lecturers,
and other officers and employees, and fix and
determine the salaries of the persons so appointed
and employed; remove any officer or employee
when in its judgment the interests of the university require; fix all fees to be charged by the
university and graduate the same as between residents, non-residents and students from foreign
countries."
The court on construing this law stated:
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"It is clear from these and other sections pertaining to the university that the Board of Regents is given complete control in the management
of its affairs, including the expenditure of its
funds, and that the only restriction placed upon
it in paying these out is that they must be used
for the purpose for which they were appropriated.
Section 1135, it will be noted, makes it the duty
of the Board of Regents to 'appoint and employ
a president of the university, and professors, instructors, lecturers, and other officers and employees, and fix and determine the salaries of persons so appointed and employed,' thus•placing
wholly within its hands the power to say who shall
enter the service of the university, from president
to janitor, and to decide how much salary he shall
receive." (emphasis added)
Although the Utah legislature intended to grant
authority to the State Board of Education to employ
state directors down to janitors, it will be remembered
that the Utah State Board of Education has not been
permitted to employ and determine the salary of state
directors or to even employ janitors on a ten1porary basis.
Assuming that the statutory authority of both departments was of equal dignity as to time, the statutes
would have to be construed so as to make the Board of
Education dominant in its field.
As was held in State v. Herrick, 140 NE 31±, 107 Oh.
St. 611, although the Department of Finance is important, its importance is not such as to overshadow all the
other departments and con1pletely reduce them to a state
of i1npotence. A reasonable construction of the relative
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authority of the two departments must be made if the
finance commission law is to be held constitutional.
In the case of State v. Herrick, supra, the contracting
authority of the Director of Highways in relationship
to the authority of the Department of Finance was discussed. The contemplated contract, however, was not
for the employment of personnel. The Ohio statutory
authority of the Department of Highways was as follows:
"Sec. 154-40. The department of highways
and public works shall have all powers and perform .all duties vested by law in the superintendent
of public works, the state highway commissioner,
the chief highway engineer, and the state building commission. * * *"
The statutory authority of the Department of Finance was as follows :
" (Sec. 154-28) The department of finance
shall have power to exercise control over the financial transactions of all departments, offices
and institutions, excepting the judicial and legislative departments, as follows: * * *
"(3) By requiring itemized statements of
expenditures proposed for any specified future
period to be submitted to the department, and
by approving or disapproving all or any p,art of
such proposed expenditures.
·
" (4) By requiring orders, invoices, claims,
vouchers or payrolls to be submitted to the department, where such submission is prescribed
by law or where the Governor shall deem such
submission necessary, and by approving or dis123
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approving such orders, invoices, claims, vouchers,
payrolls. * * *"
In this action the Director of Finance refused to
approve a contract recommended by the Director of
Highways for the reason that the said Director of Finance did "not regard it as an appropriate or desirable
contract for the state to enter into." The issue before
the court was stated as follows :
"This question is purely one of statutory
construction. The inquiry is as to the power and
authority of each of the aforesaid departments of
the administrative branch of the government, as
to what extent each is dependent upon the other,
and to what extent, if at all, the finance department is authorized to control the policy of the
highway department in the matter of state aid in
the construction of highways throughout the state.

* * *
"Each of the branches has certain duties to
discharge, and the head of each department is
burdened with certain responsibilities. The duties
of each relate to separate and distinct functions,
each requiring certain technical skill, knowledge,
experience, and training not common to all the
others."
The court further made the distinction that the Department of Highways and Public Works was not a constitutional office, but nevertheless concluded that the
Commissioner of Finance did not have authority to supervise the policies of a highway department.
"It is true that the departmet of finance is
first named, and it may be conceded that none of
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the other departments ranks greater in importance, yet it does not follow that its importance
is such as to overshadow all the others and to
completely reduce them to a state of impotence.
If any illustration is necessary to show that such
power and authority in the director of finance
as claimed in this case, if applied to all the other
administrative branches of the state government,
would completely submerge the other branches
and put it within the power of the director of finance to completely defeat and destroy the usefulness of the other branches, that illustration is
found in the facts of the present controversy.
"We shall not attempt in this proceeding to
define the duties and limitations of the director
of finance in his relations to the directors of
the other departments, but we do find it necessary and do not hesitate to say that his duties
do not reach even in the remotest degree to a control of the policies of the department of highways
and public works.
"While the Administrative Code has not attempted to define the technical qualifications of
the director of finance, it will be readily conceded
that the duties devolved upon him by that Code
require the training of a banker and an accountant. The Legislature has, however, clearly recognized the fact that the technical qualifications
of the state highway engineer, one of the offices
created in the department of highways and public
works, shall be those of a competent civil engineer, with at least five years' experience in the
construction and maintenance of highways. It
would be a little short of absurdity to require this
skilled knowledge, training and experience in the
highway department, if the policy of the highway
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department were entirely subject to the control
of the finance department."
Proper administration of the affairs of the State
Department of Education require skill, training, experi.
ence and study expected of those delegated the authority
of conducting those affairs. The members of the De.
partment of Finance cannot be expected to have those
qualifications, but rather, as stated in the preceding
case, they are selected having in mind quite different
qualifications for the performance of quite different
functions. Both departments by a proper construction
of their statutory authority can be supreme in their own
sphere of activity and as such serve a valuable function
and perform a valuable service without interfering with
the performance of the duties of other agencies.
As was stated in State v. Cunningham, 101 Pac. 962,
39 Mont. 163, the power to control the employment of
personnel gives the power to control the agency involved.
By Section 262, Revised Codes of Montana, the Board
of Examiners was given authority over en1ployment of
personnel similar to the authority granted to the Department of Finance. The Montana law stated:
"The board of examiners may at any time,
when necessary, employ clerical help for any state
officer or board, and no clerks must be en1ployed
by such officers or board without the authority
of the board of examiners, and no such clerks
must be employed by the board of examiners
except when all duties of the office cannot be
performed by the officer himself."
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Pursuant to this statutory authority the Board of
Examiners of Montana attempted to determine the compensation to be paid to an employee of the Supreme
Court. Concerning the exercise of this authority the
court stated :
"The result of this action, if it be held to be a
binding force, is that this court in some of its
important functions is subject to the control of
the state board of examiners; for to say that it
may grant the court permission to employ a stenographer is to say that in its discretion it may
withhhold permission. This means no more or less
than that, though the services of a stenographer
are absolutely necessary to the proper accomplishment of the work of the court-a fact about which
there can be no dispute-the board may in its
discretion cut off all such services, and thus virtually disable the court, or at least seriously impede and hamper it, in the discharge of its duties.
To say that it may fix the compensation to be paid
for such services is also an assertion of the same
power; for, if through mistake or lack of knowledge, or from any other cause, if any such exist,
the board should fix the compensation at such a
figure as to render it impossible to secure suitable
service, this would be attended by the same consequence as if no compensation were allowed. * * •
"In view of these considerations, it is manifest that the power to select the proper employee
could not with propriety be vested elsewhere than
in the court itself; and it is equally manifest that
the power to say whether it may or may not be
necessary to have assistance, and what the qualifications of the assistant shall be, may not be vested
elsewhere. If the power of appointment exists at
all, it is a necessary power of the court, and,
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since the qualifications of the individual desired
is determined in a measure by the amount of compensation paid for his services, the power to fix
the compensation is also a necessary power. In
short, the court has the inherent power to select
and appoint its own necessary assistants and
make the compensation due for their services a
charge against the state as a liquidated claim.
Any other conclusion would be to put t·he court
in the attitude of a petitioner to the board of examiners from time to time, and thus reduce it
from the position as a coordinate branch of the
government to the level of the ordinary citizen
who desires or claims payment for services rendered. * * *" (Emphasis added)
The Board of Education being a constitutional body
directed by the Constitution to perform functions likewise has the inherent power to select and appoint its
own necessary assistants and the power to fix the com
pensation paid to such assistants. Any construction of
any stautory law repugnant to this authority would render such statute unconstitutional.
Although the statutory law was the same at the time
the recent Utah c.ase of State Board of Education, et al.
v. Commission of Finance, supra, was decided,the Department of :B-,inance did not feel that the argument her~
presented had sufficient Inerit to urge the same upon
the Supreme Court, although the issue was raised by the
Board of Education.
The two cases dealing with the en1ployment of personnel cited by the Defendants do not support the holdings for which they are cited.
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State ex rel Y app v. Chase, 165 :Minn. 268, 206 NW
396, cited by Defendants, involved a suit brought by the
Railroad and Industrial Commission and five of its employees against the Commission of .Administration and
Finance and the state auditor for payment of salaries
determined by the Railroad and Industrial Commission.
The lower court granted a preemptory writ ordering the
Defendants to pay the salary claims. On appeal the decision of the lower court was affirmed, and in so doing
the Supreme Court stated as follows :
"If the approval of the estimate for the salaries in controversy involved the exercise of discretionary powers on the part of the Commission of
.Administration and Finance, its action cannot be
reviewed or controlled by the courts. But if these
salaries had been lawfully fixed and the existing
law gave the en1ployees named the legal right to
the amount specified in the estimate, the approval
of the estimate did not involve the exercise of any
discretionary power on the part of that Commission, and the refusal to approve it was an arbitrary act against which the courts may properly
grant relief."
The holding of the court in the above-mentioned Minnesota case supports the contention of the Intervenor
rather than the position of the Defendants on the issu8
here discussed. The court stated:
"The conclusion follows that the existing law
gave these employees a legal right to receive as
compensation for their services the amount specified in the estimate, and there was no valid reason
for refusing to approve such estimate. Its approval under s·uch circumstances did not involve
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the exercise of any discretionary power." (Em.
phasis added)
As previously stated, the preemptory writ granted
by the trial court was sustained ordering the Commission
of Administration and Finance and auditor to pay thP.
salaries of the employees involved.
The Defendants cited the case of Industrial Commission v. Price, supra, under the preceding point. The Industrial Commission of Arizona was established to administer the workmen's compensation law. The specific
statute establishing and defining the authority of the
Industrial Commission stated:
"Such employment and fair compensation
shall be first approved by the governor."

it must be recognized that there is a fundamental distinction between statutory .agencies and constitutional agencies. The legislature in establishing a law for workmen's compensation benefits could if it so desired require
the Governor to administer the provisions of that statute,
or could appoint an agency subject to the approval of
the Governor to administer the law, or might even establish an agency without the Governor's .approval to ad~
minister the provisions of the act. The Legislature havd
ing the authority to create the agency in the first instance
may define and limit the authority of such agency as it
may desire. A different situation is involved when a
constitution creates .a ~tate board of education, defining
its duties consistent with other constitutional provisions
requiring the state to provide for the education of its
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inhabitants. In this latter situation the legislature cannot
specify limitations which will frustrate and circumvent
the provisions of the constitution.
The facts before the Arizona court in the foregoing
case were substantially different than those here presented. In the first instance the specific statute referring
to the Industrial Commission required the governor's
approval. In this case the specific statute pertaining to
the Board of Education states that the. Board may appoint its various employees and has eliminated therefrom
the previous requirement that such employment be approved by the Board of Examiners or any other officer.
The specific statutory authority of the Board of Education is subsequent to the general enactment giving to the
statutory Department of Finance authority over employment of personnel.
The later case of State v. Miser, supra, is more in
point.
The cases cited by the Defendants are not in point,
to show that in the employment of personnel the Department of Finance has authority over the State Board of
Education, and therefore we must conclude:
Statutes appearing to be in conflict should be
construed in favor of granting to each department authority to operate without interference in its own sphere
of activity.
1.

2. Specific statutory authority of the Board of
Education refers to the employment of personnel by the
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Board of Education in particular, while the authority
of the Department of Finance is only general.
3. The recent statutory authority of the Board
of Education pertaining to employment of personnel su.
perseded the statutory authority of the Department of
Finance.
4. If the Department of Finance has authority to
control employment of the Board of Education personnel
and their salaries, it has in effect the power to control
the Bo.ard of Education, rendering such law unconstitutional.
5. In the employment of personnel the Department
of Finance has no authority over the State Board of
Education.

POINT V
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION MAY EMPLOY INDE·
PENDENT LEGAL ~COUNSEL WHEN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL IS REPRESENTING OTHER STATE AGENCIES
ASSERTING RIGHTS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

The Board of Education admits that it is a board
or commission of the State of Utah as referred to in
Section 67-5-1 (1), U.C.A. 1953, and th.at in ordinary
matters it looks and should look to the Attorney General for the prosecution or defense of the causes in which
it is interested. But where the Attorney General (1}
refuses to represent the Board of Education, or (2}
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, recommends that the Board of Education employ other
counsel, or (3) represents other departments asserting
authority in conflict with that of the Board of Education,
or (4) where the Attorney General is actually an adverse
party, then the Board is acting reasonably and of necessity in employing private counsel. It would be unreasonable under such circumstances to hold that the Board of
Education could not employ independent legal counsel
and that the Board could not do so without first securing
permission from the Attorney General. As was stated in
State v. Cunningham, supra, to say that one may grant
permission is to say that one in his discretion may withhold permission.
Page 99 of the Exhibit shows that in the lawsuit commenced by a taxpayer against the Board of Education
in which the Board of Education thought it important
to challenge the availability of an appropriation for a
research fund and also to challenge the authority of the
Finance Commission to fix salaries of professional personnel the Attorney General recommended that the Board
select its own counsel. Thereafter A. M. Ferro, attorney
at law, was employed by the Board of Education and
performed services in the matter of the research fund
during the months of October, November and December,
1950, and January, 1951, and rendered a statement for
such services. (Exhibit 2, Page 101)
The submission of this bill by the Board of Education and its efforts to get the Attorney General to rule
on the legality of the claim are shown at pages 100, 102
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and 103 of Exhibit 2. Such an opinion was never given
and the claim was not approved by the Finance Commission. It was therefore presented to the Board of Examiners who failed to approve it and transmitted it to the
Legislature without recommendation. (Exhibit 2, Page
104). After appropriation of the funds by the Legislature, the Governor vetoed the bill which would have paid
the claim. (Exhibit 2, Page 105)
The facts with reference to employment of counsel
in this case are similar. In answer to allegations in
Intervenor's Complaint that the Board of Education
should be allowed to employ its own counsel, the Attorney General stated:
"Whenever a dispute arises between Defendant, the Attorney General, and any other officer
of the state, including the Intervenor, the Attorney General, upon request offers to and does appoint attorneys chosen or approved by the other
state officer or agency, including the Intervenor,
as Special Assistant Attorneys General to represent said other state officer or agency whose
claims are adverse to the counsel, legal advice or
claims of the Attorney General." (Ans. to Count
V, Par. 4)
The former Attorney General, in an opinion which
was published in his biennial report June 30, 1952, commencing at Page 213, stated: "Obviously, it would be
improper for this office to attempt to represent both
sides of the controversy."
The cases clearly hold that where there is a conflict
of interest or where the Attorney General is in fact an
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adverse party, independent counsel may be employed
and the law decided in those cases does not impose any
restrictions on the exercise of that right.
In State v. Langer, supra, the court held that the
law did not require the futile action of securing the permission of the Attorney General by another state officer
when the action was against the Attorney General as a
party. The respondents objected to the jurisdiction of
the court upon the ground that no application was made
to the Attorney General to institute the proceedings.
In answer to this contention the court stated as follows:
"This technical objection is also without
merit. It is true that ordinarily the consent or refusal of the Attorney General should be secured
in initiating the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this court for the reason that ordinarily
the Attorney General is the legal representative
of the interests of the state, its sovereignty, franchises, and liberties of the people. However, the
contention is absurd that an application should
be made to that officer in an action in which he
is in fact one of the parties defendant, and which
concerns his alleged wrongful acts and seeks to
restrain them. The law does not require futile
acts. The original jurisdiction of this court is
not to be denied merely because the Attorney General happens to be one of the respondents."
The law, concerning situations where the Attorney
General is presented with a conflict of interest is reported in 7 C.J.S. 1229, Attorney General, Section 8b,
as follows:
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"Conflicting interests
"Between conflicting duties and interests the
attorney general should choose that duty or interest most closely identified with the public good.

* * *"
"Where an application to prohibit wrongful
acts would ordinarily be made by the attorney
general, but he is .alleged to be the wrongdoer, the
court may entertain the petition of parties interested without the consent of such attorney general."
The cases support the foregoing statement of the law.
In JJfarsh v. Aljoe, supra, the court had to construe
the effect of two inconsistent statutes. By one statute
the Attorney General was directed to represent claimants under the workmen's compensation statute. Under
another provision it provided:
"The Attorney General, or his deputy or assistant shall act as the attorney of the state treasurer in all cases."
The lawsuit involved an assertion by a claimant for
workmen's compensation which position was contested by
the state treasurer. The court in holding that the Attorney General owed a paramount duty to the state treasurer and could not represent both sides of the controversy stated :
"It is plain, we think, that when, under the
statutes as they now stand, the duty owed by the
Attorney General and his assistants to the claimant, under section 4328, supra, to conduct the
proceedings in this court in the latter's behalf,
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conflicts with that owed the treasurer of the state
of Wyoming in such proceedings, the duty first
mentioned must yield and the right of the treasurer to the services of the Attorney General is
paramount. In the instant case the claimant is
represented by counsel, unconnected with the Attorey General's Office, and his interests are therefore fully protected. Other reasons exist which
lead to the same result on this point, but we do not
deem it necessary to extend this opinion further."
In State v. Exectttive Council of State, 223 NW 737,
207 Iowa 923, the court stated as follows:
"The legislative call upon the Attorney General to test ·the constitutionality of the act, by
action brought by himself, overlooked the limitations upon the power of the judiciary, and quite
ignored the legitimate scope of the powers of the
Attorney General. By the very nature of his
office, and by statute, he is the legal advisor, both
of the executive council .and of the General Assembly. To require him to maintain this action
is to put him in a position which is repugnant to
his other official duties."
State ex rel Dysart v. Gage, 107 Wash. 282, 181 Pac.
855, was cited in a quotation from the Dunbar case in
the Attorney General's 1951 opinion. Here the directors
of a school district attempted to consolidate school districts upon advice of the prosecuting attorney for the
county, a statutory officer who:
"Shall have authority and it shall be his duty

• * • to appear for and represent the state and
the county and all school districts in the county in
which he is a prosecuting attorney * '"' • ."
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Entanglements arose between the districts whereupon the prosecuting attorney advised the directors to
employ the relators who were private attorneys. The
services were satisfactory and this action was brought
by the attorneys against the auditor to compel payment.
The court examined the statute creating the school districts, which had broad powers including the power to
sue and be sued, and held that these powers :
"Must include the right to employ special
counsel when, as here, the prosecuting attorney
cannot act and the necessity for legal aid is urgent. The statute heretofore referred to regarding the prosecuting attorney is merely a definition
of their powers, and does not attempt to restrain,
modify, or define the powers of boards of school
directors."
The court then noted that the attorney had advised
hiring relators (as in Ferro's case) :
"And it is apparent that the proper attention
to the affairs of the district demanded that counsel be procured to represent it, and the prosecuting attorney, being the adviser of all the school
districts, could not, in the nature of things, properly represent the interests of this district, when
they had become antagonistic to interests of the
other districts with which a consolidation had
been attempted. An urgent necessity existed for
procuring special assistance, and it was only in
meeting this necessity and upon the advice of the
prosecuting attorney that the relators were employed."
And the auditor was ordered to pay the claim.
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The Attorney General's 1951 opinion, after considering the Dunbar and Reiter cases in Washington said:

r:

"Under the authority of these cases the Finance Commission should be permitted to employ
counsel to defend it in the action which will be
brought on behalf of the Board of Education and
the superintendent to compel payment of the
salary in question."
It surely cannot be argued that the Finance Commission would have authority to employ counsel whereas
the Board of Education would not, the Attorney General
representing the opposite party in each case.

In State v. Hendrix, 124 Pac. 2nd 769, Arizona
(1942) the court stated that "the Attorney General cannot properly represent" two public officers involving
conflicting claims.
The statutory law pertaining to the authority of
the Attorney General in Arizona is practically identical
with the law of Utah with the exception that the Utah
law does not provide that no commission or agency, etc.,
shall employ any other attorney.
The court stated:
" (13-15) It not infrequently happens that
one public officer may take a certain view of the
law, while another may construe it in a contrary
manner, and litigation may properly be commenced to determine the true construction. The
attorney general obviously cannot properly represent both officers. He must choose whioh, side he
will take. If the other officer is not permitted to
secure competent counsel to represent his point
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of view, it may be that the court will be misled
into rendering a wrong judgment. Further, since
the attorney general has no discretion to determine whether suits like the present one be commenced or maintained by the auditor, it would
be unreasonable to hold that section 4-503 supra,
was intended by the legislature to deny the officer, whose discretion it was to determine whether
the suit should be instituted and maintained, the
right to be represented by counsel whom she
thought could and would present her view of the
law, in a manner satisfactory to her, to the court.

***"
In the present case we know of no Utah law specifically prohibiting the Board of Education from employing
independent counsel. And, unlike the Arizona action,
this case presents a conflict of interest with reference to
representation by the Attorney General.
It was stated in the Attorney General's opinion as
well as in the cases that it was "obvious that the Attorney General could not represent both sides of the dispute." It cannot be disputed that it is unethical for attorneys to represent both sides of a controversy or clients
having conflicting interests. Since different members
of a law firm cannot represent both sides of a controversy it should likewise follow that different members
of the Attorney General's staff should not be permitted
to litigate both sides of a dispute As was stated in
Gillam v. Sanders,204 N.C. 206, 209, 167 SE 799, 800:
"The unamendable mandate of both law and
morals forbids an attorney, in the homely phrase
of the field, 'to run with the rabbits and bark with
the hounds.' "
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The Utah court in the case of Chez, Attorney General, ex rel Weber College v. State Building Board, 93
Utah 538, 74 Pac. 2d 687, recognized the impropriety of
the attorney general's staff representing both sides of a
lawsuit. In a concurring opinion the court stated:
"The matter comes before us distinctly as a
'case made,' a 'friendly suit,' to obtain a certain
judicial determination, without a basic or real
dispute between the parties, as is evidenced by
the fact that the attorney general brings the action, and some members of his office staff appear
for plaintiffs, while others appear for defendants.
This method of presenting questions for judicial
determination is not to be commended or encouraged. It is hardly fair to the court, nor to
the parties involved."
The Defendants do not seriously contend that independent legal counsel may not be employed when there
is a conflict between two state agencies. The point of difference appears to be in the procedure to be followed
before legal counsel is selected. It is the contention of the
Defendants that permission from the attorney general
should first be secured.
The procedure suggested by the Defendants is that
if the department is not satisfied with the opinion of the
attorney general a request should be made for reconsideration of that opinion. If this is unavailing the attorney general should be requested to take legal action.
At this point the attorney general then will decide upon
which side of the controversy he will align himself, and
if there is substantial merit to the other side to warrant
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approval of opposing counsel. Applying this procedure
to the factual situation presented by the Board of Education, it shows that the requirement merely calls for
futile action.
When the Board of Examiners refuses requests for
disbursements of funds the Board of Education should
request the attorney general to again reconsider opinions as to the authority of the Board of Examiners. It
is not seriously believed that the attorney general would
reverse these prior opinions. Then, according to the
Defendants, requests should be made upon the attorney
general to bring action on behalf of the Board of Education against the Board of Examiners. Again this action
would seem to be futile and unnecessary since it is conceded by the Defendants that the attorney general cannot
represent both sides and to assume that the Attorney
General would choose to represent the Board of Education involving a suit challenging prior opinions of the
attorney general and the authority of a board upon which
the attorney general is a member is completely unreasonable and illogical. Even at this point, however, according
to the Defendants, the Board of Education would not be
permitted to employ legal counsel, but rather they must
now request the attorney general to determine if the
proposed case challenging the opinions of the attorney
general and the action of the board of which he is a
member has any merit. Of course the attorney general
would be reluctant to see such a suit commenced, and
further, to have the expense of employing special coun142
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sel charged against his department. The entire suggested
procedure is completely futile and illogical.
In the pleadings of this case and by official opinion
the Attorney General recognizes the impropriety of his
office representing both sides of a dispute. Yet the Attorney General insists that his permission must be secured before the agency not represented by his office can
employ independent counsel. In an attempt to comply
with this requirement request was made to the Attorney
General for permission to employ counsel to instigate
an original action in the Supreme Court challenging the
authority of the Board of Examiners to reduce the salary
of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. (Exhibit 2, Page 107) Even though the Attorney General
does not feel qualified to represent the Board of Education in such matters, he apparently feels that he is qualified in spite of his conflict in interest to decide whether
or not suit should be commenced which would involve
him as a party challenging the authority of the action
of a board of which he is a member.
There is an additional reason why the Board of Education should be permitted to employ independent legal
counsel without securing the permission of the Attorney
General or having such counsel appointed as an assistant
attorney general. The Attorney General is appropriated
funds with which to carry on the normal operations of
his office. To require him to appoint special counsel to
litigate issues in which the Board of Education is primarily interested is to require him to pay out of his
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budget the expenses so involved. Naturally, under such
circumstances ,he would be reluctant to incur this additional expense. It is more logical to require the Board
of Education to incur this expense since they are most
directly affected.
By the pleadings the Attorney General claims to be
the exclusive counsel for all state agencies and departments. Yet in the Ferro case the Attorney General declined to represent the intervenors and suggested that
independent counsel be employed. Thereafter the Attorney General failed to give an opinion authorizing payment, the Board of Examiners failed to approve payment, and after the Legislature appropriated funds for
payment the Governor vetoed the same. This is just one
more example of the subjugation of the Board of Education by the Attorney General, Board of Examiners, and
the Governor.
By refusing to represent the Board of Education,
by failing to approve payment for independent legal
counsel, by failing to appoint independent legal counsel,
by vetoing appropriations made for payment, the Attorney General, the Board of Examiners and the Governor
continue to completely control and subordinate the Board
of Education even to the extent of attempting to prohibit and thwart the Board's right and duty to secure
judicial interpretation of its constitutional authority.
When the Attorney General (1) refuses to represent
the Board of Education or (2) recommends that the
Board of Education employ other counsel, or (3) repre-
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sents other departments asserting authority in conflict
with that of the Board of Education, or (4) where the
Attorney General is actually an adverse party, the Board
of Education must be permitted to employ independent
legal counsel.

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that the declaratory
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. To
affirm the District Court his court must conclude as a
matter of law the following:

1:J·

~.:

~I

1. The State Board of Education was created by
the constitution. It is a constitutional body. Its executive
officer was named in the executive department of Government.

2. Article 10 of the Constitution of Utah vests in
the State Board of Education the general control and
supervision of the public school system. Such powers,
rights, duties or functions as are within the terms, control and supervision used in Section 6 of Article 10 are
not subject to c;ontrol or the approval of either the Board
of Examiners or the State Commission of Finance.
3. The State Board of Education in order to have
control and supervision of the public school system
must have the power and right to manage, handle, expend, employ and supervise all funds and personnel within its jurisdiction.
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It must have the exclusive right to determine the use,
need, wisdom of and discretion in the expenditure of
appropriated funds for the management, direct~on, administraJtion, operation and regulation of the public
school system. In this respect it must have the right to
select personnel and fix their salaries.
4. Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution of
Utah specifically excludes from the jurisdiction of the
Board of Examiners
(a) Compensation of all officers which has
been fixed by law and
(b) Balaries of persons working for the state,
its institutions and departments.
5. As to claims originating with or incurred by the
Board of Education or their proper agents, the Board
of Examiners has the authority to examine said claims
only as to their legality, more particularly in the following respects : I'S the claim correct in amount; was it incurred for a lawful purpose; and is money in the treasury
from which that claim can be lawfully paid~ With reference to said claims the function of the Board of Examiners is essentially ministerial. The Board of Examiners
cannot exercise discretion or review the wisdom of the
expenditures except as to the personal expenses of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the members
of the Board.
6. The authority of the Board of Examiners as contained in Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution of
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Utah is only granted until otherwise provided by law
and may therefore be modified by the Legislature.
7. The Governor and the Commission of Finance
do not have authority to reduce appropriations made by
the Legislature for public school purposes.
8. The Finance Commission in exercising budgetary
control in conjunction with the Governor or in preauditing the expenditures of the State Board of Education has ministerial authodty only to determine that said
expenditures are within appropriated funds and are for
public school purposes.
9. The Board of Examiners and the Finance Commission do not have authority over the employment of
experts or specially qualified personnel by the Board
of Education.
10. The Board of Education m,ay employ independent legal counsel when the Attorney General is representing other state .agencies asserting rights in conflict
with the authority of the State Board of Education.
This includes the situation where the Attorney General is actually an adverse party or I efuses to repre-sent
the Board of Education or recommends that the Board
of Education employ other counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
DAN S. BUSHNELL and
RICHARDS AND BIRD
.Attorneys for Respondents.
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